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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant 
to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE ONE 
Did the Trial Court err in failing to apply the statute of 
limitations at found at Section 78-12-5, U.C.A., or the doctrine of 
laches? Should the Trial Court not have found that an unadjudicated 
claim of boundary by acquiescence is barred by the statute of 
limitations or by laches unless an action is commenced either as 
soon as the boundary is challenged, or, at the latest, within seven 
years of when all of the necessary conditions last existed? 
Standard of Review: Questions of law are fully reviewable on 
appeal. Supporting authority: Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997). 
The issue was preserved by the Trial Court's adverse ruling. 
ISSUE TWO 
Did the Trial Court err in finding a boundary by acquiescence? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's determination of that a 
given set of facts gives rise to a determination of acquiescence is 
reviewable as a matter of law. However, when the determination is 
highly fact sensitive, the appellate court grants the trial court 
some measure of discretion. Supporting authority: Wilkinson Family 
Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 1999 UT App 366, 993 P.2d 229. 
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The issue was preserved by the Trial Court's adverse ruling. 
ISSUE THREE 
Did the Trial Court err in finding that the effect of the 
finding of estoppel against Dahl Investment Company was merely to 
be applied to determining whether Dahl Investment Company was 
entitled to claim the area covered by the Hughes' driveway? Should 
the Trial Court have rather found that the estoppel was a complete 
defense to Dahl Investment Company's action, or that the estoppel 
was the basis for fashioning a more complete equitable remedy? 
Standard of Review: Questions of law are fully reviewable on 
appeal. Supporting authority: Newspaper Agency Corp. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997). 
The issue was preserved by the Trial Court's adverse ruling. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Section 78-2a-3(2) (j), U.C.A. 
78-2a-3(2)(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from 
the Supreme Court. 
Section 78-12-5, U.C.A. 
78-12-5. Seizure or possession within seven years necessary. 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the 
possession thereof shall be maintained, unless it appears that 
the plaintiff, grantor or predecessor was seized or possessed 
of the property in question within seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
Section 78-12-7, U.C.A. 
78-12-7. Adverse possession - Possession presumed in owner. 
In every action for recovery of real property, or the 
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possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to 
the property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof 
within the time required by law; and the occupation of the 
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been 
under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it 
appears that the property has been held and possessed 
adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
Section 78-12-11, U.C.A. 
78-12-11 What constitutes adverse possession not under 
written instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by 
a person claiming title, not founded upon a written 
instrument, judgement or decree, land is deemed to have been 
possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial 
enclosure. 
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon dams, 
canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the 
purpose of irrigating such lands to the sum of $5 
per acre. 
Section 78-12-12, U.C.A. 
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid. 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered 
established under the provisions of any section of this code, 
unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and 
claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that, 
his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was brought by Dahl Investment Company, seeking to 
establish a boundary by acquiescence between its property and the 
Hughes property directly to its West. Dahl Investment Company asked 
that the boundary by acquiescence be set 15.09 feet West of the 
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boundaries which appear in the legal descriptions of the two 
properties, along the line where a fence had once existed. Hughes 
brought a third party claim against the owner of the property to 
their West, Progressive, L.C., seeking that a boundary by 
acquiescence be established between their two properties. Hughes 
asked that the boundary be set one foot West of a telephone pole 
and along the Eastern edge of a driveway located between the Hughes 
lot and the Progressive, L.C. lot. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The matter came on for trial in the Layton Department of the 
Second District Court, Davis County, Utah, on April 4, 2003, the 
Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge, presiding. Third 
Party Defendant Progressive, L.C. made no appearance at the trial. 
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case, the Court entered the 
default of Third Part Defendant Progressive, L.C. At the conclusion 
of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the Court asked the 
parties to submit written memoranda regarding the legal issues 
raised at trial, and the Court set the matter for closing argument 
on May 4, 2003. Dahl Investment Company and the Hughes submitted 
their memoranda. They made their closing arguments to the Court on 
May 4, 2003. The Court made its ruling from the bench. A motion for 
clarification of the ruling was filed by the Hughes, which was 
heard by the Court on October 28, 2003. The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and final Order, were thereafter submitted to 
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the Court and were signed and entered on December 8, 2003. The date 
the notice of appeal was filed was January 7, 2004. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY 
With regard to the boundary between the Center Lot and the 
East Lot, the Trial Court found mainly for the Dahl limited 
partnership. The Trial Court ruled that a boundary by acquiescence 
had been established between the West Lot and the Center Lot 
between the years 1924 and 1965 along the fence line which had 
existed between the properties during those times. The Court found 
that the old fence line had run about 18 feet West of the West 
boundary set out in the legal description of the East lot. This was 
about 3 feet further West than had been claimed by Dahl Investment 
Company in its complaint. As an exception to its ruling, the Trial 
Court also found that the Dahl limited partnership was estopped 
from claiming the area covered by the driveway built by the Hughes 
after they purchased the Center Lot. 
With regard to the boundary between the Center Lot and the 
West Lot, the Court ruled that the boundary between them be set as 
prayed for by the Hughes: one foot West of the telephone pole and 
along the Eastern edge of the driveway between the two properties. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On or about October 14, 1998, Appellants (hereinafter Hughes) 
purchased, from one Elsie Taylor, a 90 foot by 190 foot rectangular 
parcel of real property, with improvements, containing about 0.39 
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acres, located in Section 10, Township 4 North Range 2 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, Davis County, Utah, hereinafter the "Center 
Lot". [R. Pi's Ex, #5]. At the time of the trial time the property 
contiguous on the Southern portion of the East side of Hughes' 
property was owned by a limited partnership whose general partners 
included Van Dahl and Evan Dahl, hereinafter the "East Lot". [Tr. 
Vol. I p. 68]. The property contiguous on the Northern portion of 
the East side of the Hughes property was owned by C & H Associates, 
not a party to this case. [Tr. Vol. I p. 43] . The property 
contiguous on the West side and the North side of the Hughes' 
property was owned by Progressive, L.C., hereinafter the "West 
Lot". [Tr. Vol. I p. 152] . Figure 1, which is included here, shows 
the relative positions of the lots. Figure 1 is an enlargement of 
a part of a Davis County plat map of the Southwest Quarter Section 
of Section 10. The full quarter section plat map was introduced as 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 at trial. An 8^ by 11 inch reproduction of 
part of Exhibit 11 is attached as Addendum 14 to this brief. Figure 
1 shows the Center Lot, belonging to the Hughes, with the name 
Center Lot written on it. The Center Lot is numbered 0006 on the 
map. The West Lot, belonging to Progressive, L.C., has the name 
West Lot written on it, and is identified as lot number 0047. The 
East Lot, belonging to a limited partnership with Van Dahl and Evan 
Dahl included among the general partners, has the name East Lot 
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written on it, and is identified as lot number 0068. The Southern 
boundaries of the three lots in question are along the South border 
line of Section 10. In Figure 1, the South line of Section 10 is 
shown by a heavy dotted line running right to left near the bottom 
of the page. North is at the top of page. 
The three properties subject to this action were at one time 
all part of a larger parcel, containing about 49.8 acres, purchased 
by one Thomas J. Thurgood, in 1909. [R. Pi's Ex. #1] . The 
description of the Thurgood property begins at the Southeast Corner 
of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10. All of the properties 
related to this case are described in relationship to that 
particular quarter section corner. 
A parcel including what became the East Lot was deeded to Earl 
W. Dahl and Evaline Dahl in 1923. [R. Pi's Ex. #2]. Evaline Dahl 
was Thomas J. Thurgood's daughter. [Tr. Vol. I p.13]. The original 
Dahl property contained about 6 H acres. The original DahL property 
was subsequently divided and the East Lot created. Most of the Dahl 
property was sold to C & H Associates for development of the 
Banbury Subdivision. [R. Pi's Ex. #7]. The East Lot, as shown on 
the quarter section plat map and as described in PLaintiff's 
complaint is a rectangular parcel 133 feet by 127.41 feet, and 
contains about 0.39 acres. [R. Pi's Ex. #11]. 
The chain of title for the Center Lot is as follows: as stated 
above, Thomas J. Thurgood purchased his 4 9.8 acre tract on or about 
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February 6, 1909. [R. Pi's Ex. #1] . Thomas J. Thurgood and his wife 
Gerda M. Thurgood deeded a 6.625 acre lot to Merl M. Thurgood 
(Thomas J. Thurgood's son) on March 14, 1946. [R. Pi's Ex. #3]. 
The Merle M. Thurgood lot included the property which would later 
become the Center Lot. Merle M. Thurgood and his wife, Betty C. 
Thurgood, divided their lot and created from it what is now the 
East Lot. They sold the East Lot, a 90 foot by 190 foot lot, of 
about 0.39 acres, to John G. Taylor and Elsie W. Taylor, on March 
15, 1958. [R. Pi's Ex. #4]. The Hughes purchased the Center Lot, 
from Elsie W. Taylor on or about October 14, 1998. [R. Pi's Ex. 
#5] . The legal description for the Center Lot remained the same as 
it appeared in the Merle M. Thurgood & Betty C. Thurgood deed to 
John G. Taylor & Elsie W. Taylor from 1958. 
There were no surveys introduced with regard to the East or 
West boundary lines of the Center Lot. [Tr. Vol. I p. 132, 141]. 
On the West side of the Center Lot, there was a driveway and 
a telephone pole which the Hughes and the owner of the West Lot 
used as points of reference to establish the boundary between the 
West Lot and the Center Lot. [Tr. Vol. I p. 138]. 
After Dahl Investment Company brought this action against the 
Hughes, with regard to the boundary between the Center Lot and the 
East Lot, the Hughes brought Progressive, L.C. in as a third party 
defendant, with regard to the boundary line between the Center Lot 
and the West Lot. Progressive L.C. did not answer or contest the 
13 
third party complaint. It was represented to the Trial Court that 
the Hughes had reached an agreement with Progressive, L.C. [Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 1] . The boundary between the Center Lot and the West Lot 
was set as running North and South one foot to the west of the 
telephone pole, along the East side of a driveway located there. 
[R. p. 131]. The boundary so established was some feet to the West 
of the description in the Hughes' deed. There was no direct 
testimony as to exactly how many feet to the West. Defendant's 
Exhibit 13, introduced at trial, and reproduced as Addendum 16, 
shows the telephone pole, the driveway, and the West side of the 
Hughes house, and gives some idea of the distance between the 
Hughes house and the telephone pole and the driveway. 
With regard to the boundary between the East Lot and the 
Center Lot, Dahl Investment Company, in its complaint, asked that 
the North-South boundary between the lots be moved from 127.41 feet 
West from its Eastern boundary, which is the distance set forth in 
the property's legal description, to 142.50 feet West from its 
Eastern boundary, a distance of exactly 15.09 feet. [R. p. 2]. The 
Eastern boundary of the East Lot is 1,291.72 feet West of the 
Southeast Corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10. The 
location of the Western boundary of the East Lot was therefore to 
be established at 1,434.22 feet west of the quarter section corner, 
according to the complaint. Dahl Investment Company alleged that 
the boundary should be established there because a North-South 
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fence line had existed for a long time at that location between the 
properties. [R. p. 4]. 
It was not disputed at trial that at one time a fence had run 
North and South between the two lots, and that it had run from near 
the sidewalk at the South boundaries of the Lots North between the 
East Lot and the Center Lot, and had continued North for a total 
distance of nearly 80 rods, or 1320 feet. [Tr. Vol I p.179]. The 
Dahl family had kept cattle on the East lot in the mid 1960's, and 
the fence controlled the cattle on the Dahl property at that time. 
[Tr. Vol. I p. 30] . 
At the time the Hughes purchased the Center Lot, there was no 
fence between the Center Lot and the East Lot. [Tr. Vol. I p. 131, 
R. p. 134]. There were physical structures and objects which had 
been on the East Lot and the Center Lot for a substantial amount of 
time. The house where the Hughes reside was originally built by 
Thomas J. Thurgood, and could be used a point of reference. There 
is also a house on the East Lot which has been there for a 
substantial amount of time. 
At trial, there was no evidence as to how many feet from the 
house on the Center Lot the old fence was located, nor how many 
feet from the house on the East Lot the old fence was located. 
There was no evidence introduced by Dahl Investment Company as to 
where exactly the old fence had been located. 
There is a tree between the two houses, although no testimony 
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was introduced as to how long it has been there or whether it was 
at some point coexistant with the former fence or how far the fence 
may have passed to the East or West of the tree. A photo showing 
the driveway built by the Hughes, and showing the tree between the 
Center Lot and the East Lot, was introduced as Defendant's Exhibit 
#26 at trial, and is attached to this brief as Addendum 17. The 
photo shows that the tree is to the East of the driveway which the 
Hughes built. There was evidence that the Hughes believed that the 
tree was on their property. [Tr. Vol. I p. 150, 151, 156]. The 
Trial Court found credible the evidence given by the Hughes that 
when they told Van Dahl that they intended to cut the tree down, 
that Van Dahl asked the Hughes not to cut it down. The Trial Court 
inferred that Van Dahl's posture was that of a neighbor making a 
request, and that he was not claiming the tree was on the East Lot 
property at the time of the conversation. [Tr, Vol. II, p. 39]. 
Within a year after Hughes acquired the Center Lot they commenced 
to put in a large driveway, running North and South, with its East 
edge running parallel to and within what they considered to be the 
East side of their property boundary with the East Lot. [Tr. Vol. 
I p. 148] . 
At least two other structures exist which were referred to at 
trial, but they are not directly between the East Lot and the 
Center Lot. The first is an old chicken coop, whose Eastern part 
sits on the parcel of land contiguous to the North boundary of the 
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East Lot. [Tr. Vol. I p. 75] The parcel In question is identified 
as lot number 0076 in Figure 1, and is owned by C & H Associates, 
the partnership which developed the Banbury Subdivision. The C&H 
Lot is contiguous to the Northern part of the East boundary of the 
Center lot. [R. Pi's Ex. #11]. It appears that the Western portion 
of the chicken coop was constructed on property which became part 
of the northern portion of the Center Lot. [Tr. Vol. I p. 33]. 
The second structure referred to at trial is a chain link 
fence which begins about 104 feet North of the North boundary of 
the Center Lot, or 294 feet North of the South Section Line, and 
runs North from there for about 1025 feet. [R. Pi's Ex. #6][Tr. 
Vol. I p. 39-47]. 
The exact location of the old chicken coop was not established 
a trial. There was testimony at trial, however, that had been 
remains of an old fence some 20 feet North of the chicken coop in 
about 1997 when C & H Associates was attempting to locate its West 
boundary to install a new boundary fence. [Tr. Vol. I p. 47-59]. 
There was also evidence that when the old fence existed next to the 
chicken coop that it ran about five or six feet to the West of the 
chicken coop. [Tr. Vol. I p.17-8]. 
The chain link fence was put in about 1997 by C & H 
Associates. The location of the fence was based upon remnants of 
the old fence and a boundary agreement between C & H Associates and 
Syracuse City. The parties to the boundary agreement did not 
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attempt to trace the location of the old fence line where it had 
run South from their properties down between the East Lot and the 
Center Lot to the Section Line. In preparing the legal description 
of the boundary, the parties to the boundary agreement projected 
their portion of the old fence South to the Section Line, to a 
point 1,437.10 feet West of the Southeast Corner of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 10. [Tr. Vol I. p. 38-59] . There was no 
testimony or other evidence as to how close the projected fence 
line passed to the chicken coop. When the Trial Court found that 
the old fence line ran about 18 feet West of the legal description 
of the East Lot, it appears that the Trial Court was taking the 
projection of the old fence line from the boundary agreement area 
further North and treating it as the location of the old fence line 
further to the South. 
At trial, it was testified by Van Dahl and Evan Dahl that 
there had been cattle on the original Dahl Property in the mid 
1960fs. [Tr. Vol I. p. 30, 67]. The fence contained the cattle. The 
Dahl's testified that the ground became contaminated, and that the 
cattle were moved to across the street in about 1965. [Tr. Vol. I 
p. 67]. After that, the fence was not kept in repair. The Hughes 
produced evidence, in the form of testimony by Norris Watkins, the 
son of the John and Elsie Taylor, who had lived in the house on the 
Center Lot, that the fence between the Center Lot and the East Lot 
had ceased to exist by 1971. [Tr. Vol. I p. 17]. There was no 
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evidence from the Taylor's son, Norris Watkins, that the former 
fence line had been used as a property boundary or as a boundary 
regarding the use of the property of the East Lot or the Center 
Lot, after 1971. Rather, he testified that his parents, the former 
owners of the Center Lot, had parked a school bus between their 
house on the Center Lot and the house on the East Lot, on top of an 
old ditch way, in an area now claimed by Dahl Investment Company. 
[Tr. Vol. I p. 120]. The disappearance of the old fence by 1971 was 
advanced by the Hughes in support of their claim that the statute 
of limitations barred any clam of Dahl Investment Company. 
According to the Hughes, when the Hughes purchased the Center 
Lot from Elsie Taylor, Dahl Investment Company was not using the 
disputed strip of land. [Tr. Vol. I p. 149]. They stated that no 
objection to the construction of the driveway being built by the 
Hughes was made during construction by any member of Dahl 
Investment Company. [Tr. Vol. I p. 149]. (This claim was disputed 
by Van Dahl) . Testimony from the Hughes was that Van Dahl came over 
on several occasions and complimented them as the work 
progressed.[Tr. Vol. I p. 158]. After more than a year of work by 
Hughes towards completion of the driveway, Van Dahl then made a 
claim that the driveway encroached upon the West side of the East 
Lot. 
Van Dahl spray painted a mark on their driveway to mark what 
he said was the boundary. 
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This action followed. 
In its complaint, filed August 21, 2001, Dahl Investment 
Company alleged that the Hughes were entitled to no more than 90 
feet of frontage, the amount set forth in their deed. [R. p. 3]. 
Dahl Investment Company, however, claimed the right to expand its 
frontage from the 127.41 feet granted in its property description 
to 142.50 feet. At trial, Dahl Investment Company advanced the 
argument that the boundary should be set a further 2.88 feet to the 
West. The further claim at trail was apparently based upon bringing 
the fence line projection from the boundary agreement between C & 
H Associates and Syracuse City, South for 294 feet to the South 
Section Line and using the projection as if it were the old fence 
line. [R. Plfs Ex. #6]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
ISSUE ONE 
The Trial Court erred in failing to apply the statute of 
limitations at found at Section 78-12-5, U.C.A. or the doctrine of 
laches. A party seeking to establish a boundary by acquiescence 
should bring the action as soon as the boundary is challenged, if 
the party has met the requirements for twenty or more years 
immediately prior to commencing the action. If the party has not 
maintained all of the necessary requirements until the time of 
trial, but had maintained them for a period of more than twenty 
years, and had maintained them within seven years before the 
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commencement of the action, the party could still bring the action. 
Otherwise the party would be barred by the statute of limitations 
or by laches. 
ISSUE TWO 
The Trial Court erred in finding a boundary by acquiescence 
between the East Lot and the Center Lot, There had been no visible 
fence, monument or building fixing the location of the claimed 
boundary line for between 5 and 30 years, depending on the witness. 
The Trial Court failed to distinguish the facts of the instant case 
from the case of Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1998). There 
was no established chain of owners acquiescing in the claimed 
boundary. 
ISSUE THREE 
The Trial court erred in finding that the effect of the 
finding of estoppel against Dahl was merely to be applied to 
determining whether Dahl was entitled to claim the are covered by 
the driveway. The Trial Court should have rather found that the 
estoppel was a complete defense to Dahl's action, or was the basis 
for fashioning a more complete equitable remedy. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
ISSUE ONE 
The Trial Court erred in failing to apply the statute of 
limitations at found at Section 78-12-5, U.C.A. or the doctrine of 
laches. 
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After the parties had submitted their memoranda and made their 
arguments to the Trial Court on May 4, the Trial Court ruled that 
the statute of limitations can never apply in a case of boundary by 
acquiescence similar to the case at bar: 
"As to the statute of limitations, I understand what Mr. 
Backman (trial counsel for Hughes) has stated but if I accept 
what you state Mr. Backman, I believe that every case - there 
wouldn't be a case of boundary by acquiescence because there 
would always be a statute of limitations argument. I think for 
the statute of limitations to start to run on a case like 
this, somebody has to be put on notice and then the time 
period goes. It can't just be 40 years goes back, nothing 
happens and then you have to then file it. If that's not 
correct, then that's something that an appellate court can 
also review but I don't believe that - I have not seen any 
cases cited to me that say in this type of case, the statute 
of limitations would be appropriate." [Tr. Vol. II p.37]. 
It should be noted first of all that the Trial Court was 
correct with regard to the lack of cases discussing the statute of 
limitations (or laches) and boundary by acquiescence. This appears 
to be a case of first impression in Utah on that point. The Hughes 
respectfully disagree with the Trial Court's legal analysis, 
however. 
There appear to be at least two ways in which the statute of 
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limitations (or laches) could be reasonably applied. First, the 
method in which a claim of adverse possession is applied. Section 
78-12-7, U.C.A. provides as follows: 
78-12-7. Adverse possession - Possession presumed in owner. 
In every action for recovery of real property, or the 
possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to 
the property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof 
within the time required by law; and the occupation of the 
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been 
under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it 
appears that the property has been held and possessed 
adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action, (emphasis added). 
The statutory scheme in an adverse possession case requires 
that the seven years of adverse possession be the seven years 
before the filing of the action. The adverse possession could be 
for much more than seven years, of course, just so long as the 
possession in the last seven years meets the statutory 
requirements. 
Applying a similar rule to a case of boundary by acquiescence, 
a plaintiff seeking to quiet title to land up to a fence or other 
boundary would need to show that all of the elements necessary to 
establish a boundary by acquiescence had been in existence for the 
twenty years prior to commencing the action. The fence and other 
23 
elements could have been in existence for 20, 40, or even eighty 
years. What would constitute a proper claim would be that the 
elements existed at the time the action was commenced, and had been 
for at least twenty years before that. 
A second way in which the statute of limitations could be 
applied would be that a plaintiff would need to bring its action to 
determine a boundary by acquiescence with seven years of when last 
all of the necessary elements to establish the boundary had 
existed. In other words, if the plaintiff had possessed land up to 
a fence for a period of at least twenty years, and then one or more 
of the elements ceased to exist, the plaintiff would still have 
seven years to bring its action to quiet title to the land up the 
acquiesced boundary. This would seem to be the plain reading of 
Section 78-12-5, U.C.A. 
One of the problems in taking the approach stated by the Trial 
Court is that a plaintiff may assert a claim for boundary by 
acquiescence at any time, even decades after the necessary elements 
to establish a boundary have ceased to exist. This presents an 
unfair burden on the parties in trying to find and present credible 
evidence at trial. All the property owners who had knowledge of 
when a fence was built, by whom it was built, the reason that it 
was built, whether it was regarded as a boundary, how the property 
on either side was used, over time, even the location of the fence, 
etc., could all be unavailable due to age or death. That was 
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certainly the case in this matter, 
Thomas J, Thurgood, who acquired all of the property in 
question in this case, in 1909, was no longer living. Earl W. Dahl, 
who, with his wife Evaline Dahl, acquired the original Dahl 
property, including the East Lot, in 1923, was no longer living. 
Evaline Dahl was no longer living. Merle M, Thurgood, who acquired 
the property which contained the Center Lot in 1946 was no longer 
living. John G. Taylor and Elsie W. Taylor, who purchased the 
Center Lot from Merle M, Thurgood and his wife in 1958, were both 
no longer living. The Trial Court found a boundary by acquiescence 
based upon a fence which had existed from 1924 through 1965. Yet 
none of the persons who had owned the adjoining properties from 
1923 through 1965 were alive at the time of trial. Even the old 
fence between the East Lot and the Center Lot had ceased to exist 
and its former location was uncertain. 
The need for a statute of limitations is recognized in every 
other kind of civil case. There seems no good reason why a statute 
of limitations should not apply in a case where a plaintiff seeks 
to establish a boundary by acquiescence. Any statute of 
limitations, even a twenty year statute of limitations, applied to 
this case, would bar recovery by the Dahl limited partnership. 
ISSUE TWO 
The Trial Court erred in finding a boundary by acquiescence 
between the East Lot and the Center Lot. 
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The elements necessary to establish a boundary by acquiescence 
are well established: 
Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, 
or buildings; 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
for a long period of time; 
by adjoining landowners. 
See Orton v. Carter, 970 P. 2d 1254, 1998 Utah, citing Judd 
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hutchinqs, 797 P. 2d 1088, 1090 (Utah 
1990). 
Hughes maintain that the Dahl limited partnership failed to 
produce clear and convincing evidence to prove the necessary 
elements at the trial. 
For the reasons set forth in the argument concerning the 
statute of limitations (or laches), above, Hughes maintain that the 
Dahl limited partnership failed to meet the first element because 
the Trial Court's ruling was based only on a fence which existed 
from 1925 to 1965. Hughes maintain that in order to meet the first 
element, that the Dahl limited partnership was required to show 
that the old fence had continued to exist, at a minimum, until 
seven years before the Dahl Investment Company filed its complaint. 
The complaint was filed August 21, 2001, so the fence would have to 
have existed until at least August 21, 1994 to support a finding of 
a boundary by acquiescence. If the fence no longer existed, there 
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needed to be at least some visible monuments or buildings between 
the East lot and the Center Lot which would establish the exact 
location of the claimed boundary. 
The Trial Court found that the old fence between the East Lot 
and the Center Lot had ceased to exist by the time the Hughes 
purchased the property on or about October 14, 1998. The evidence 
with regard to the old fence prior to that time was in conflict. 
Norris Watkins, the son of John G. Taylor and Elsie Taylor, 
testified at trial that the fence had ceased to exist between the 
two properties by 1971. [Tr. Vol. I p. 117] Blake Hazen, a 
principal of C&H Associates, investigated the old fence line in an 
area to the North of the East Lot and the Center Lot. He saw some 
fence remnants perhaps 200 feet North of the road, which was North 
of the Center Lot and well North of the East Lot. [Tr. Vol. I p. 
48] . Upon cross examination Blake Hazen stated that the remnant 
which he had seen was perhaps 10 to 20 feet North of the chicken 
coop. [Tr. Vol I p.54] 
Evan Dahl testified about the fence as follows: 
"Well, there hasn't been much of a fence on the front couple 
hundred feet but there's remains of a fence and for the last few 
years there was remnants of that fence. Of course that's 
disappeared now, but there was posts back where the chicken coop 
was. We haven't had a need to maintain that because we haven't been 
raising cattle or anything of that nature so the fence has not been 
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maintained but there was remnants, stubs of posts as welL as wire 
and that hasn't been very many years, probably the last five years 
I haven't seen that." [Tr. Vol. I p. 65]. Van Dahl testified that 
the first 30 feet of so of the fence had been gone for a long, long 
time. [Tr. Vol. I p. 33]. 
No evidence was produced which attempted to fix the location 
of any posts or other remnants which had once existed between the 
East Lot and the Center Lot. 
In short, there was no evidence as to the exact location of 
the old fence. Dahl Investment Company, in its complaint, alleged 
that the fence had been 15.09 feet West of the legal description of 
its West boundary. [R. p. 2]. There was no evidence introduced to 
support its allegation. 
The Trial Court found that the old fence line had run about 18 
feet West of the legal description of the West Boundary of the East 
Lot. [R. p. 129] . This finding was apparently based upon a 
projection from a boundary agreement between C&H Associates and 
Syracuse City. The boundary agreement, however, was based upon a 
line established by actual fence remnants which existed well to the 
North of the Center Lot and the East Lot. There was no evidence 
that the projected line actually represented the old fence line 
between the East Lot and the Center Lot. 
The Trial Court failed to distinguish the facts of the instant 
case from the facts of Orton V.. Carter, supra. In the Qrton case, 
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the fence line used to establish the boundary was between the two 
properties, and led directly to the centerline of a driveway. The 
fence line and the driveway centerline existed at the time of 
trial, and provided an exact, visible boundary. In this case, the 
fence erected pursuant to the boundary agreement between Syracuse 
City and C&H Associates, lies between their two properties, and 
ends some 104 feet North of the Center Lot and 161 feet North of 
the East Lot. There is no visible monument on either the East Lot 
or the Center Lot to tie to the projected line. The closest 
building which could be tied to the projected line would be the old 
chicken coop. Based upon the testimony at trial, the old fence line 
ran some five or six feet West of the chicken coop. No attempt was 
made however to see if the projected line from the boundary 
agreement, when brought South, passed with five or six feet of the 
chicken coop. 
The evidence produced by the Plaintiff also failed to 
establish an unbroken chain of boundary acquiescence by the 
predecessors of Hughes and the Dahl limited partnership. The 
failure to establish that each successor in interest acquiesced to 
the claimed boundary is a bar to recovery. See James v. Griffin, 
626 N.W. 2d 704, (N.D. 2001). In the James case, the Court found 
that failing to show that one interim owner acquiesced to a 
boundary broke the chain required of the plaintiff. The result was 
that the plaintiff had start over with the following owner to try 
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to add up the necessary time of acquiescence. 
In this case, the chain of acquiescence was broken by the 
Taylors and by the Hughes. After 1971f the Taylors used the 
disputed territory to park a school bus. There is no evidence that 
they acquiesced to the old fence line as a boundary after that 
time. The Hughes, since acquiring the Center Lot from the Taylors, 
in 1998, have not acquiesced to the old fence line as a boundary. 
In part this was because from the time they purchased the Center 
Lot there was no fence line to which they could acquiesce. The 
building of their large driveway could also be viewed as not 
acquiescing to the boundary claimed by Dahl Investment Company. 
ISSUE THREE 
The Trial Court erred in finding that the effect of the 
finding of estoppel against Dahl was merely to be applied to 
determining whether Dahl was entitled to claim the are covered by 
the driveway. 
The Trial Court found that the Dahl limited partnership had 
remained silent while the Hughes were constructing their large 
driveway, when the Dahl limited partnership had a duty to warn the 
Hughes that the driveway was being constructed, in part, over 
property claimed by the Dahl limited partnership. Van Dahl, one of 
the general partners, lives across the street from the Hughes and 
could see their daily out of door activities. The Hughes started 
their driveway in about 1999, the year after they purchased the 
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property. They continued work for more than a year on the driveway 
before Van Dahl objected to the placement of the driveway. 
An action to establish a boundary by acquiescence is equitable 
in nature, and subject to equitable defenses. It is well 
established that in order to receive equitable relief that one must 
come to the court with clean hands. The finding by the Trial Court 
that the behavior of the Dahl limited partnership was such as to 
invoke an estoppel should have been a bar to any relief, and not 
limited to excluding the Hughes driveway area from the boundary by 
acquiescence claim. 
In the alternative, given that the Trial Court made a finding 
that the behavior of the Dahl limited partnership was such as to 
give rise to an estoppel, the Trial Court could have fashioned a 
more complete remedy. 
In the case of Ives v. Grange, 134 P. 619 (Utah 1913), the 
Utah Court, in resolving the competing claims of the parties, 
required that those who had paid property taxes on property awarded 
to others were entitled to be reimbursed for the taxes that they 
had paid on said property. The Court further required that those 
acquiring property by the Court's ruling should be required to pay 
the fair market value of the property acquired to those losing the 
property. Applying a similar rule in this case would require the 
Dahl limited partnership to pay the Hughes the market value of the 
property added to the East Lot. The Dahl limited partnership would 
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also be required to reimburse the Hughes and their predecessors for 
the property taxes paid on the property being added to the East 
Lot. See also Section 78-12-12, U.C.A., requiring that a person 
seeking to establish title by adverse possession must have paid the 
taxes on the property for seven years. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Trial Court should be reversed and a order 
of no cause should be entered against the Dahl limited partnership. 
In the alternative, the Dahl limited partnership should be required 
to pay to the Hughes the market value of the property added to the 
Dahl limited partnership lot and should reimburse all taxes paid by 
the Hughes and the Hughes' predecessors for taxes paid on the 
property added to the Dahl limited partnership lot. 
Dated this ^ day of May, 2004 
NORTHERN UTAH LEGAL AID FOUNDATION 
L 
By 
Frank G. Smith 
Attorney for Appellants. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
CARVEL R. SHAFFER #2916 
DAVID J. SHAFFER #8077 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Key Bank Building 
562 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
(801) 299-9453 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAHL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE L. HUGHES, SR., and 
PATRICIA L. HAMPTON-HUGHES, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. DlOl/O^-WO 
Judge \<LQy 
Plaintiff DAHL INVESTMENT COMPANY, by and through its attorney, Carvel R. 
Shaffer, hereby alleges and complains against Defendants as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff owns real property in the City of Syracuse, Davis County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendants are residents of Davis County, State of Utah, and own real property in 
Syracuse, Davis County, State of Utah. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
3. This court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §78-3-4, Utah Code 
LAYTOM CSTRiCTSOin" 
aus23 3 2Qpii '0l 
SECCMO DISTRICT COURT 
Z0GUUG21 P 2 " 2 8 
Annotated, 1953. 
4. Venue is proper in the above-entitled court pursuant to §§78-13-1 and 78-13-7, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
GENERAL 
5. Plaintiff is the owner of real property located in Syracuse, Davis County, State of 
Utah, Tax Serial No. 12-052-0068. The legal description is as follows: 
BEGINNING 1291.72 FEET WEST FROM SOUTHEAST 
CORNER OF SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 10, 
TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE 
AND MERIDIAN; THENCE WEST 127.41 FEET; THENCE 
NORTH 133 FEET; THENCE EAST 127.41 FEET; THENCE 
SOUTH 133 FEET TO POINT OF BEGINNING, LESS STREET. 
6. Plaintiffs predecessors in interest have used and occupied said property together 
with additional footage in excess of 40 years. The real property Plaintiff and Plaintiffs 
predecessors have used abuts the east boundary of Defendants' property. 
7. The following property description should be established as the correct property 
description of Plaintiff s property: 
BEGINNING AT 1291.72 FEET WEST FROM THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP 4 
NORTH RANGE 2 WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND 
MERIDIAN; THENCE WEST 142.50 FEET; THENCE NORTH 
133 FEET; THENCE EAST 142.50 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 133 
FEET TO POINT OF BEGINNING. 
8. Defendants are owners of real property located at 1782 West 1700 South, 
Syracuse, Davis County, State of Utah, Tax Serial No. 12-052-0006, more particularly described 
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as follows: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 86 RODS WEST FROM 
SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF 
SECTION 10, TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 2 WEST, SALT 
LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; THENCE NORTH 190 FEET; 
THENCE WEST 90 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 190 FEET; 
THENCE EAST 90 FEET TO POINT OF BEGINNING. 
9. The real property owned, occupied and used by Plaintiff and Defendants is 
contiguous with a common boundary line between the east boundary line of Defendants' property 
and the property line occupied and used by Plaintiff and Plaintiffs predecessors. 
10.. Defendants and Defendants' predecessors have occupied 90 feet of frontage and 
Plaintiff and Plaintiffs predecessors have occupied 142.50 feet of frontage. 
11. The common boundary line between the properties has been visibly marked for a 
long period of time and has been the agreed upon boundary line. There is a fence line still in 
existence to the north of the property in question and the fence line evidences the fact that the 
agreed upon boundary is as set forth by Plaintiff herein. There is no question that the long-
accepted and agreed upon boundary line is as set forth by Plaintiff herein. 
12. Defendants have encroached on the property of Plaintiff by placing a driveway 
thereon. Defendants should be required to remove the encroached driveway. 
13. Plaintiffs predecessors constructed chicken coops on the property in question at 
least 40 years prior to date hereof, which adds further substance to the fact that the boundary line 
as claimed by Plaintiff is the common agreed upon boundary line. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
BOUNDARY LINE BY ACQUIESCENCE 
14. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth at length 
herein. 
15. Plaintiffs and Defendants1 predecessors in interest agreed upon the common 
boundary line between the two properties over 40 years ago. Said boundary line has markers and 
other evidence that the boundary line as claimed by Plaintiff is the agreed upon boundary line 
between the Plaintiff and Defendants. There is evidence of a fence line being on the boundary 
line as Plaintiff claims, together with chicken coops that establish said boundary line as alleged 
by Plaintiff. Said boundary line has been agreed upon and acquiesced by all previous owners. 
16. Plaintiff is entitled to the property occupied based on Utah Code Annotated, §57-
6-4(2) Color of Title. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
QUIET TITLE 
17. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth at length 
herein. 
18. Based upon the fact that Plaintiff has used the property, had a common boundary 
line between the two properties, and occupied the same for at least 75 years, title to the property 
described in paragraph 7 above should be quieted in the name of Plaintiff precluding Defendants 
or any of Defendants1 successors in interest from having any interest in and to said property. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
ESTOPPEL 
19. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth at length 
herein. 
20. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs predecessors have occupied and used the subject real 
property up to the east line of Defendants1 property as set forth in paragraph 7 above. 
21. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs predecessors have held themselves out as fee simple 
owners of the property up to the common line between the legal descriptions as set forth in 
paragraph 7 and Defendants' property as set forth in paragraph 8. 
22. Plaintiff and Plaintiffs predecessors have relied on the boundary line between the 
properties to be the same as set forth in paragraphs 7 and 8 above. 
23. Because of the use of the real property by Plaintiff, Plaintiff would suffer 
irreparable harm if the court ruled that Plaintiff was not entitled to ownership of the footage 
between Plaintiffs legal description and Defendants' legal description. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For an Order of the Court determining that Defendants' property has a 90-foot 
frontage and the remaining property to the east of said 90 feet is owned by Plaintiff. 
2. For an Order of the Court determining that the boundary line between Plaintiffs 
and Defendants' property is the line established by the parties for at least 40 years. 
3. For an Order quieting title to the property in the name of Plaintiff as set out in 
paragraph 7. 
4. For an Order of the court declaring that Plaintiff and Plaintiffs predecessors have 
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occupied the real property set forth in paragraph 7 for at least 40 years and that Plaintiff and 
Plaintiffs predecessors are entitled to fee simple ownership of the real property as set forth in 
paragraph 7. 
5. For an Order of the Court that Plaintiff has ownership of said properly based on 
Utah Code Annotated, §57-6-4(2^ Color of Title. 
6. For costs of Court incurred herein, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
7. For what other relief the Court may deem just and equitable. 
DATED th i s^ / day of August, 2001. 
R. SHAFFER 
*6rney for Plaintiff 
C VOPFICEMM0.Hafiies.CoaipUutt.ftn 
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KEITH M. BACKMAN #6472 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES, P.G. 
4605 S. HARRISON BLVD., #300 
OGDEN, UTAH 84403 
(801 479-4777 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAHL INVESTMENT CO. 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WAYNE L. HUGHES, SR. and PATRICIA L. 
HAMPTON-HUGHES, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER 
Case No. 010602740 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
Defendants, Wayne L. Hughes, Sr. and Patricia L. Hampton-Hughes, hereby submit their 
answer to plaintiffs complaint. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
To the individual allegations of the complaint, defendants answer as follows: 
1. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 4 of the complaint. 
2. Defendants are without sufficient information regarding the allegations of paragraph 5 of 
the complaint and therefore deny those allegations. 
3. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 6 arfd 7 of the complaint. 
4. Defendants admit the allegations of paragraph 8 of the complaint. 
5. Defendants admit that their property is contiguous to the plaintiffs property as alleged in 
paragraph 9 of the complaint, but deny all other allegations of paragraph 9. 
6. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the complaint. 
7. Defendants admit they have placed a driveway on their property, but deny that they have 
encroached on the plaintiffs property as alleged in paragraph 12. 
8. Defendants admit that there is a chicken coop in the area as alleged in paragraph 13 of 
the complaint, but deny all other allegations of paragraph 13. 
9. No response is necessary to paragraph 14 of the complaint. 
10. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 15 and 16 of the complaint. 
11. No response is necessary to paragraph 17 of the complaint. 
12. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraph 18 of the complaint. 
13. No response is necessary to paragraph 19 of the complaint. 
14. Defendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the complaint. 
15. Defendants deny all allegations of the complaint not specifically admitted herein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs are estopped from claiming title to the property to which they claim title in the 
complaint. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Defendants claims are barred by the doctrines of waiver and laches. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
To the extent that such evidence is discovered, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs claims are 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are barred by public policy. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to allege a legally sufficient basis, in fact or in law, upon which to predicate an 
award of attorney's fees. 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Defendants reserve the right to assert any and all other affirmative defenses as set forth in Rule 8, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which discovery reveals to be applicable, so as to avoid waiver of same. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed in its entirety, with 
prejudice, and that the Plaintiff take nothing thereby; that Defendants have judgment against Plaintiff for 
Defendant's costs incurred herein, including reasonable attorney's fees, and; for such other and further 
relief as the court deems just and appropriate. 
DATED this \Q day of September, 2001 
Keith M. Backman 
Attorney for Defendants 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on this 10** y of September, 2001,1 faxed a copy of this answer to Carvel 
R. Shaffer, attorney for plaintiff, at (801) 298-1576, and also mailed^opy to Mr. Shaffer at 562 S. 
Main, Bountiful, Utah 84010. ^ 
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CARVEL R. SHAFFER #2916 
DAVID J. SHAFFER #8077 fjjjy J5 2 Qi; pjj "Vj 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ° 
Key Bank Building 
562 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
(801) 299-9453 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAHL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE L. HUGHES, SR, and 
PATRICIA L. HAMPTON-HUGHES, 
Defendants. 
WAYNE L. HUGHES, SR. and PATRICIA L. 
HAMPTON-HUGHES, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROGRESSIVE, L.C., 
Third-Party Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
PLAINTIFF'S POSITION 
Civil No. 010602740 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
COMES NOW THE Plaintiff by and through its attorney of record and hereby submits 
the following Memorandum in Support of its Position as follows: 
FACTS 
1. This matter was tried before the Honorable Thoma^L. Kay April 4,2003. 
2. This cause of action arose over a boundary line dispute which came to light when 
Defendants encroached on the property Plaintiff claims ownership by acquiescence, by placing 
pavers to establish a driveway. Prior to that time, there had been no claim by Defendant or any 
of Defendant's predecessors of entitlement to the property west of the original fence line. There 
had been no claim subsequent to the time that Thomas J. and Elizabeth R. Thurgood conveyed 
the property to separate owners. 
3. The property in question was owned by common ownership by virtue of a Deed 
dated February 6,1909, recorded in the Office of the Davis County Recorder in Book V, Page 
551 of Deeds evidencing that Thomas J. Thurgood was the owner of the entirety of the property 
in question. See Exhibit 1, which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. 
4. Subsequent thereto by a Warranty Deed dated January 15, 1923, recorded in the 
Office of the Davis County Recorder January 27, 1923, at 9:30 a.m. (See Exhibit 2 which is 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference), Thomas J. Thurgood and Elizabeth R. Thurgood, 
his wife, conveyed six and one-half acres of the property on the east to Earl W. Dahl and Evaline 
Dahl as Grantees (See Exhibit 2). 
5. On January 15, 1923, the property was no longer under common ownership and 
the fence was constructed at that time to define the boundary line between the two properties. 
6. Thomas J. Thurgood and his wife, Elizabeth R. Thurgood transferred the property 
to the west of the fence line on or about January 1,1946, to Merl M. Thurgood by virtue of a 
Warranty Deed recorded in the Office of the Davis County Recorder December 3,1951, as Entry 
No. 120654 (See Exhibit 3 attached hereto and incorporated by reference). 
7. The property on the east of the fence line has remained in the Dahl family 
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subsequent to the Deed dated January 15,1923 (Exhibit 2). The property on the west of the 
fence line was conveyed by Merl M. Thurgood to John G. Taylor and Elsie W. Taylor, husband 
and wife, on or about March 15, 1958 (See Exhibit 4 attached hereto and incorporated by 
reference). 
8. The property on the west was conveyed to Defendants by virtue of a Warranty 
Deed executed by Elsie W. Taylor as Trustee on or about October 14,1998 (See Exhibit 5 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference). 
9. Plaintiff commenced this action on or about August 21, 2001, to have the Court 
establish the common boundary line between the two properties based upon the monument and 
markers that had been established by the prior owners and to quiet title to the property on the east 
of the fence line that had been established as the acquiesced boundary line. 
10. Pursuant to the Complaint, when the Defendants encroached on the property in 
question by placing pavers to establish a driveway on the property which Plaintiff owns by virtue 
of the acquiescence, Plaintiff commenced this action. That was the first evidence that 
Defendants claimed any right to the property on the east of the original fence. 
11. Based upon testimony of witnesses of Plaintiff, the fence line was constructed at 
the time the property was separated into two parcels. Dahls had animals on the property and 
have used the property up to the fence until the Defendants began placing pavers on the property. 
The witnesses of Plaintiff established the fact that the fence was constructed when the property 
was deeded to separate owners and became the defining line between the two properties. The 
owners of the property acquiesced to the fence being the defining line between the two properties 
at all times prior to this action. 
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12. Plaintiff continued to mow the area up to where the property line had been 
acquiesced to, bailed the hay and/or grass and sold it. Plaintiff has used the property up to where 
the original fence was constructed up to the present day. 
13. David R. Miller, the individual renting the home that is situated upon the Dahl 
property, testified that there were remnants of the original fence on the acquiesced property line 
at the time the Defendants purchased the property from Taylors. (See Exhibit 5) 
14. Plaintiffs witnesses testified that the chicken coop that is on the property east of 
the fence was owned by Dahls, had been used by Dahls, and that there was sufficient footage 
between the chicken coop and the fence line for a tractor and implements to traverse. The fence 
line that was the original defining line that separated the parcels and agreed upon as the boundary 
line continued from its inception until at least the time that the Hughes moved into the property. 
The fence line was the original boundary line at all times prior. 
15. For over 40 years, the adjoining land owners acquiesced in the fence being the 
dividing line between the two properties. 
16. The fence that separated the Dahl property and the property to the west, presently 
owned by Hughes and others to the north, had a common fence that ran north and south between 
the property line of the Dahl property and the property to the north of the Hughes property. Even 
though the fence had somewhat deteriorated between the Dahl area that Hughes presently owns, 
that fence to the north remained and the testimony of Plaintiff s witnesses was that the fence line 
to the north ran from the south boundary north in a straight line, thus establishing the exact area 
where the boundary line had been acquiesced. 
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ARGUMENT 
There are four requirements to establish boundary line by acquiescence: 
i. Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, oik 
buildings; 
ii. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
iii. For a long period of time; and 
iv. By adjoining landowners. 
Plaintiff has established by evidence the fact that the fence was constructed at the time the 
two properties were separated into separate parcels from Thomas J. Thurgood. The Dahls owned 
the property on the east of the fence line and have maintained and used the property up to the 
fence line subsequent thereto continually. The time set by the Court is 20 years to establish a 
boundary line by acquiescence. 
Plaintiff gave evidence to establish that the owners of the adjoining property recognized 
the physical boundary line for a long period of time. There was sufficient evidence to establish 
that the adjoining land owners acquiesced in the fence line being the boundary line in excess of 
20 years. 
Two recent cases by the Appellate Court regarding boundary line by acquiescence support 
the Plaintiffs argument that the line should be established as it was acquiesced in by the property 
owners after the 20 years had elapsed. 
In Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,(Utah 1998) the Supreme Court of Utah held that the 
"trial court did not err in finding that the parties and their ancestors in title had acquiesced in the 
old fence line as the boundary line between their properties because the existence of a portion of 
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the old fence between the lots, together with the well-defined common lane, constituted a 
sufficiently visible line marking the boundary between the properties for more than 20 years." 
The Court further held "to create a boundary by acquiescence, the law merely requires a 
recognizable physical boundary of any character which has been acquiesced in as the boundary 
line for a long period of time." In general, a boundary line must be maintained for at least 20 
years to establish boundary by acquiescence. When the 20 years has expired, the line is 
established for all succeeding owners. 
Plaintiff gave sufficient evidence in this case that the established fence line between the 
two properties was the acquiesced line for more than 20 years. The fence line was the original 
agreed upon boundary line. There is a chicken coop that was constructed by Dahls on the 
acquiesced property. There is no evidence to the fact that Hughes claimed any interest 
whatsoever in and to said chicken coop. 
In the case of Mason, et al. v. Loveless, et aL May 3,2001,24 P.3d 997, the Court of 
Appeals also held that "boundary by acquiescence is a long established doctrine in Utah. Its 
purpose is to establish stability and boundaries, repose of titles, and the prevention of litigation. 
To establish boundary by acquiescence, a claimant must show: (1) occupation up to a visible line 
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings; (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
(3) for a long period of time; (4) by adjoining land owners. Failure to meet any one of the 
elements of the doctrine defeats the boundary." The court further holds that "mutual 
acquiescence in a line as a boundary has two requirements: that both parties recognize the 
specific line, and that both parties acknowledge the line as the demarcation between the 
properties. Boundary by acquiescence thus, requires more than mere acquiescence in its use; it 
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requires acquiescence to line as a boundary." The court further holds "acquiescence in use is not 
equivalent to acquiescence in a boundary. Acquiescence is more merely synonymous with 
'indolence' or 'consent by silence/" Thus settled case law in Utah clearly providesihat 
acquiescence may be established by silence. 
Pursuant to the Orton v. Carter case, the court held that the boundary line had been 
acquiesced in for at least 20 years even though the owners had established a common lane 
between the two properties and had modified the fence line. The boundary line had been 
acquiesced in for at least 20 years, thus establishing the common agreed upon acquiesced line. 
The Court further holds that "nowhere has this Court stated that a boundary line must be a single 
and uninterrupted structure. The law merely requires 'a recognizable physical boundary of any 
character which has been acquiesced and is a boundary for a long period of time.'" 
In Mason, the parties' predecessor had constructed a fence that separated the properties. 
The Court held that the fence was in existence as early as 1929 and separated the parcels of 
property. The fence existed for approximately two miles. Some time in 1980, the property to the 
west was purchased by another party. The party to the west claimed that the boundary line had 
not been acquiesced in by previous owners. 
The Court held that since the owners of the land on both sides had occupied and used 
their land up to, but not beyond the fence, that the fence line had been acquiesced to as the 
boundary line. There was no evidence presented at the trial that the owners of the land on the 
west had objected to the location of the fence prior to 1980. The Court held that the owners of 
the property located on either side of the fence acquiesced in the use of the fence as a boundary 
line between 1929 until 1980. 
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The Court also determined that the boundary line by acquiescence had been established as 
early as 1949 which is the 20-year period. The Court further held that the purpose of establishing 
a boundary by acquiescence allowed stability and boundaries, repose of title and prevention of 
litigation. Hales v. Frakes. 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1997). 
Based upon the Mason v. Loveless case, the boundary by acquiescence was established by 
the Plaintiff in the case before the court by 1943 which constitutes the 20 years subsequent to the 
property not being in common ownership. 
There was clear evidence given that Dahl and the property owners to the west acquiesced 
in the fence line being the boundary. Even though the fence had deteriorated, there were 
remnants of the fence which remained on the property even when the Taylors purchased the 
same. The Dahls continued to mow the grass/ hay up to where the boundary had been acquiesced 
to, and there was a common ditch that ran between the two properties which continued to 
separate the two properties. 
In Jensen v. Bartlett 286 P.2d 804, (Utah 1955) the Supreme Court held that there was a 
boundary line by acquiescence once all the requirements were met. In that case, the Plaintiffs 
claimed property by acquiescence in an old fence line as the boundary line between their 
properties for a long period of time. The Court found that prior to 1916 until July 21,1950, the 
Plaintiffs and their predecessors had occupied all the land west of the fence which had previously 
been erected and that during all such time had planted crops and cultivated and farmed the 
property up to the fence. Also, the owners to the east of the property had also occupied the fence 
up to the fence, planted crops, cultivated, and farmed the land, located buildings upon the 
property and never claimed any ownership in the property to the west prior to July 21,1950. 
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Defendants purchased the property in 1950 and for the first time claimed the additional land to 
the west. In this case, the trial court found that the parties acquiesced in the fence as marking the 
boundary line and treated the same as the acquiesced boundary line between 10,16 to 1952, a 
period of some 36 years. The Court further held that it is well recognized that where the parties 
have acquiesced in a fence as marking the boundary for a long period of time, it is immaterial 
whether there was an express agreement to that effect or not. Under such proof, the court will 
indulge a fiction or hold that there is a presumption that such an agreement existed. 
In the instant case Defendants encroached on the acquiesced property of Dahls by laying 
pavers as a driveway. That incident precipitated this lawsuit because that is when Plaintiff 
became aware that Defendant claimed an interest in the property that had previously been 
acquiesced to by the prior owners of both properties on the east and west of the fence. Defendant 
has no right whatsoever in and to the property where the pavers encroach upon the acquiesced 
property because there has been no modification of the acquiesced line. Plaintiffs representative 
Van Dahl, advised Defendant that Plaintiff claimed ownership in the property and never gave 
approval either by silence or by expression. Defendants took it upon themselves to construct the 
pavers. The Court should order that the pavers be removed and that Plaintiff have ownership in 
and to the property up to where the acquiesced line was established. The statute of limitations 
does not apply in this case because once a boundary is established by acquiescence, it remains the 
boundary until it is modified by the property owners. 
CONCLUSION 
It is Plaintiffs position that the boundary line was acquiesced in long before the Hughes 
purchased the property. When the Hughes purchased the property in 1998, the boundary line had 
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already been acquiesced to as the line between the properties. There was sufficient evidence 
presented by Plaintiff to establish that the boundary line between the properties was the line that 
the fence established. Therefore, the Court should rule in favor of Plaintiff determining that the 
boundary by acquiescence is where the original fence line was established and quiet title to 
Plaintiff in the same. 
There is no statute of limitation in this case because the fence line had been acquiesced 
to; therefore, there is no need even to review that because based upon all previous cases quoted 
above, once the line is acquiesced to by the owners for a long period of time, the line is thus 
established. Therefore, the statute of limitations does not apply. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ d a y of May, 2003. 
C \OFFICE\Dahl\M€morandumf2J Support 1 wpd 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAHL INVESTMENT CO., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAYNE L. HUGHES, SR. and PATRICIA L. 
HAMPTON-HUGHES, 
Defendants 
WAYNE L. HUGHES, SR. and PATRICIA L. 
HAMPTON-HUGHES, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PROGRESSIVE, L.C., 
Third Party Defendant. 
POST-TRIAL BRIEF 
Case No. 010602740 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
Pursuant to the court's order during the trial of this matter on April 4, 2003, defendants and third 
party plaintiffs Wayne L. Hughes, Sr and Patricia L. Hampton-Hughes ("the Hughes") hereby submit 
their post-trial brief. 
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BACKGROUND 
At the conclusion of the evidence in the trial on April 4, 2003, the court raised a number of issues 
and requested that the parties brief them by May 15, 2003 prior to holding closing arguments on this 
matter on May 20, 2003. The issues which the court asked the parties to brief are: 
1. Whether a boundary by acquiescence could be established when there was no longer a 
visible boundary line on the property and what effect the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Orton 
v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1998) has in this case; 
2. Whether the plaintiffs action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and what 
effect the uncontroverted existence of the fence from 1925 to 1965 has on this matter; 
3. Whether the plaintiffs failure to notify the defendants that their driveway was on the 
property the plaintiff claimed created an estoppel which prevents the plaintiff from claiming that 
property by acquiescence; and 
4. Whether the stipulation of the parties on the morning of trial prohibits the plaintiff from 
claiming that the boundary was established by the ditch instead of the fence. 
In this brief, the Hughes will address these issues in this order. 
ARGUMENT 
All of the parties agree that the disputed property in this action is contained in the Hughes' legal 
description and the plaintiff is claiming that property under a theory of boundary by acquiescence. See 
Stipulation of the Parties. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence was adopted by the Utah courts 
around the turn of the century. See Homes v. Judge. 87 P. 1009 (Utah 1906). Since at least the 1960s, 
the Utah courts have held that in order to establish a claim for boundary by acquiescence, the party 
claiming acquiescence must prove four elements. These elements are: 
1. occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, 
2. mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary, 
3. for a long period of time1 
4. By adjoining landowners. 
Fuoco v. Williams. 421 P.2d 944 (Utah 1966) ("Fuoco IT). 
The person claiming the boundary by acquiescence has the burden of proving each of these 
elements and the failure to prove even one of the elements will result in the rejection of the claim. Ault 
v. Holden. 2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781 at f l6 (Utah 2002). Furthermore, "The mere fact that a fence 
happens to be put up and neither party does anything about it for a long period of time will not establish 
it as the true boundary." Glenn v. Whitney. 209 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1949). 
I. THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED OCCUPATION UP TO A 
VISIBLE LINE MARKED BY MONUMENTS, FENCES OR BUILDINGS. 
The first element of boundary by acquiescence is that the plaintiff must establish that it occupied 
the property up to a visible line marked by monument, fences or buildings. In discussing this element, 
the courts have stated that "A claimed boundary line by acquiescence must be open to observation . . . 
A boundary line, to be established by acquiescence, must be definite, certain and not speculative." 
Fuoco H 421 P.2d at 946. 
This definite line is usually established by a fence or other visible line which exists on the day that 
the suit is filed. See e.g.. Ault v. Holden. at ^ 5-6 ("On the north side of the strip is a fence line. . . On 
the west, the fence continues . . , " ) : Jacobs v. Hafen. 917 P.2d 1078, 1078 (Utah 1996) ("An old fence, 
which has been in existence for more than 40 years, cuts through Jacobs1 property. It is located about 
!More recently, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that it will not consider claims of 
boundary by acquiescence unless the acquiescence has continued for at least 20 years. See 
Jacobs v.Hafen. 917 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1996). 
360 feet south of the county line and runs east to west for about 1,300 feet and then north to the county 
line.") 
In other cases, the definite line is established by a fence or other line which has been recently 
destroyed and the destruction of which is the catalyst for filing the suit. See e.g. Hales v. Frakes. 600 
P.2d 556, 557 (Utah 1979) ("The controversy arose when the defendant, in 1974, tore down the fence 
two rods inside his northern boundary, and claimed to the true boundary line."). 
This brings us to the case the court identified during the trial: Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1998). In Orton, the Utah Supreme Court allowed a party to establish a boundary by 
acquiescence by a fence which had been torn down approximately 60 years prior to the instigation of the 
suit. This finding was based on unique facts in Orton which assured the court that the boundary was 
"definite, certain and not speculative." There is not the same degree of certainty in this matter, and the 
court should find that the plaintiff has failed to establish a definite line. 
In order to properly assess Orton, it is necessary to review its facts. The case involves two 
adjacent lots on Center Street in Panguitch, Utah. One of these lots is referred to as the East Lot and 
the other is the West Lot. The disputed boundary runs north and south between these two lots. 
Before 1925, a fence running north and south was established between the two properties and 
treated as the boundary line. In the 1930s, the owners of the properties agreed that it would be 
convenient to establish a lane along the boundary to reach the rear of the properties. The owners 
therefore took down the southerly portion of the old fence and each owner put up a new fence eight feet 
on his property so that each owner contributed 8 feet to a common 16-foot access lane. Significantly, 
the lane did not extend for the length of the boundary, and the old fence remained as the boundary 
between the two properties north of the lane. The Ortons bought the East Lot in 1940 and used the 
lane. In 1972, the Carters bought the West Lot. At that time, one of the fences which marked the 
boundary of the lane still existed as dfd the portion of the old fence north of the lane. The Carters were 
told that the old fence was the boundary line and that each of the lots had contributed one-half of the 
land for the common lane. 
After purchasing the west lot in 1972, the Carters built an office building on the property and 
leased it to the United States Forest Service. The Ortons apparently continued to use the lane until 
1992. By 1992, however, the Carters and the Ortons were involved in a boundary dispute, and the 
Carters removed the last remnants of the old fence. The Carters also had a survey performed which 
indicated that the actual property line was 18 feet east of the old fence line. The Carters attempted to 
occupy up to the line in the legal description and the Ortons sued on a boundary by acquiescence 
theory. The Ortons prevailed in the trial court and the Carters appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court on the boundary by 
acquiescence theory, but noted that 
It is undisputed that before the Carters purchased the West Lot all prior owners of both 
lots viewed the old fence line as the boundary between the two lots and that the owners 
occupied their respective properties to that line. The Carters were specifically informed 
of that fact. In addition, the common lane itself evidences the prominence of the old 
fence as the boundary line. The center of the common lane followed exactly the line 
originally followed by the old fence. Furthermore, for numerous years parallel wooden 
fences, measured eight feet in each direction from the center line, clearly designated the 
common lane as an additional boundary marker . . . The trial court did not err in finding 
that the partial fence, together with the well-defined common lane, constituted a 
sufficiently visible line marking the boundary between the properties. 
Id. at 1257. 
In Orton» the court found that the trial court did not err in finding a boundary by acquiescence 
when all of the following elements existed. Those elements are: 1) a partial fence along the claimed 
boundary line on the Carter's property, 2) the common lane; 3) the remnants of the fences eight feet on 
either side of the claimed line, 4) explicit statements to the Carters that the old fence line had been 
recognized as the fence line; and 5) the Ortons use of the common lane for 20 years after the Carters 
bought their property. All of these elements are missing from the case between the plaintiff and the 
Hughes. 
Although there was a remnant of a fence to the north of the Hughes property, it was on a 
completely separate lot and there was nothing to indicate that the old fence line should be continued 
onto the Hughes' property. There was no common right-of-way, remnants of other fences or other clear 
line on the ground which the Hughes could have observed. In addition, no one informed the Hughes 
that there was a line on the ground that marked a boundary line. Even its own witnesses indicate that 
the plaintiff did not inform the Hughes that it claimed the disputed property until they had leveled the 
ground and started the installation of the driveway. Finally, the Hughes did not own the property for 
twenty years and observe the plaintiff using the property before this action was commenced. 
Taken as a whole, the evidence in this case cannot approach the certainty required by Utah law 
to establish a boundary by acquiescence. The lack of certainty is probably best illustrated by the 
testimony of Van Dahl, who was asked how far the fence was from the chicken coop. In response, Mr. 
Dahl stated that he could not say exacdy-all he knew was that there was enough room to move a 
manure spreader between the chicken coop and the fence. This description fails to indicate the location 
of the fence with the certainty necessary to establish a boundary by acquiescence. 
II. THE PLAINTIFF HAS NOT PROVED THAT THE OWNERS! OF THE 
PROPERTIES ACQUIESCED IN THE FENCE AS A BOUNDARY. 
The second element a party claiming a boundary by acquiescence must prove is that the owners 
acquiesced in the line as a boundary. Utah courts have consistently held that this acquiescence must be 
mutual. 
Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the party attempting to establish a 
particular line as the boundary between properties must establish that the parties 
mutually acquiesced in the line as separating the properties.... To do so, the party must 
show that both parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line, such as a fence or 
building, as the boundary of the adjacent parcels. 
Ault v. Holden. 2002 UT 33, 44 P.3d 781 at \ 18 (Utah 2002) (emphasis in original). 
The plaintiff has failed to carry this burden of proof. Although the plaintiff has presented 
substantial evidence that they considered the fence to be the property line, they have presented no 
evidence that the Hughes or their predecessors in interest acquiesced in the fence as the property line. 
Without evidence of mutual acquiescence, the plaintifPs claim must fail. 
In addition, the plaintiffs claim of mutual acquiescence is undercut by its own testimony that the 
purpose of the fence was the to contain animals. Since 1954, Utah courts have consistently held that if 
the purpose of the fence or other line across the property was something other than marking the 
boundary, a claim of boundary by acquiescence will fail. This doctrine was first stated in Ringwood v. 
Bradford, 269 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1954): In that case, the evidence showed that the purpose of the fence 
which the plaintiff was claiming as a boundary was to protect young saplings from sheep. The court 
stated: 
the presumption [of an implied agreement between the parties to establish the boundary] 
may be rebutted by (1) proof there actually was no agreement by the parties or (2) by 
proof that there could not have been a proper agreement. Factors showing the latter 
include the following: (a) no dispute or uncertainty over boundary, (b) line not intended as a 
boundary, (c) no parties available to make an agreement and (d) possibly mistake or 
inadvertence in locating the boundary line. 
Id. at 1055-56 (emphasis added). 
This reasoning has been used in other cases as well, such as Hummel v. Young. 265 P.2d 410 
(1953) (no boundary by acquiescence when purpose offence was to keep horses out of neighbors5 
garden). In this case, both Van Dahl and Verl Dahl testified that the purpose of the fence was to keep in 
the cattle that Van Dahl raised until the land became contaminated in the 1960s. BotH of them also 
testified that they no longer maintained the fence after this time, because there was no reason for the 
fence after Van Dahl moved his cattle to his property south of Antelope Drive. Because the purpose of 
the fence was not to mark a boundary, the plaintiffs claim must fail. 
m , THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF UMITATIONS AND THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES. 
Even if the court believes that the plaintiff might have presented a valid claim of boundary by 
acquiescence, the court should find that the claim is barred by both the statute of limitations and the 
doctrine of laches. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5 states: 
No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall be 
maintained, unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor or predecessor was 
seized or possessed of the property in question within seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-7 states, in relevant part: 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the person 
establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof 
within the time required by law; and the occupation of the property by any other person 
shall be deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title . . . 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5, the plaintiff must show that it was in possession of the 
property within the seven years prior to the filing of the suit. In addition, because the parties have 
stipulated that the disputed property is in the Hughes' legal description2, the court must presume that the 
Hughes were in possession of the property until the plaintiff presents evidence to the contrary. See Ives 
v. Grange. 42 Utah 608, 134 P. 619 (1913). 
In this matter, the testimony of all of the parties agrees that for the last seven years, the land has 
been vacant. No significant activity has occurred on the property since Van Dahl removed his catde in 
the 1960s. This evidence is insufficient to meet the plaintiffs obligation to establish possession of the 
property and to overcome the presumption that the Hughes had possession of property contained in 
their legal description. This action is therefore barred by the statute of limitations. 
For this reason, the uncontroverted evidence that the fence existed from 1925 to 1965 is 
irrelevant. The plaintiff must show that it possessed the disputed property within 7 years. A showing 
that it (or its predecessors in interest) possessed the property prior to 1965 is irrelevant. 
Even if the court does not believe that the statute of limitations applies, the court should hold that 
the plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. Laches is based upon the "maxim that equity 
aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. It is defined as neglect to assert a right or 
claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causes prejudice to [the] adverse 
party, operates as a bar in a court of equity." Black's Law Dictionary. 6th ed. 1990 at 875 (quoted with 
approval in CIG Exploration. Inc. v. State. 2001 UT 37, 24 P.3d 966 at [^14 (Utah 2001)). 
2See paragraph 4 of the parties' stipulation: "[Tjhe property you [plaintiff] claim to have 
an interest in is included in the Hughes' legal description." 
In this matter, the plaintiff waited almost 35 years after abandoning the fence to bring the cause 
of action. During that time, the Hughes bought the property without notice of any claim the plaintiff 
had to the disputed property. Also during that time, the Hughes' predecessors in interest, who could 
have supplied testimony regarding any agreements between themselves and the plaintiff, died. These 
predecessors in interest could also have provided vital testimony regarding the conversations between 
themselves and the Dahls. See Ault v. Holden. 2002 UT 33, 44 R3d 781 at [^21 (" Indeed, mere 
conversations between the parties evidencing either an ongoing dispute as to the property line or an 
unwillingness by one of the adjoining landowners to accept the line as the boundary refute any allegation 
that the parties have mutually acquiesced in the line as the property demarcation.") 
The plaintiff has offered no explanation for this delay and the court should find that the delay is 
unconscionable and apply the doctrine of laches to bar the plaintiffs claims. 
IV. THE PLAINTIFF IS BARRED BY THE STIPULATION FROM 
ASSERTING A CLAIM TO THE DISPUTED PARCEL BASED ON THE 
DITCH. 
At the commencement of the trial in this matter, the parties stipulated to a number of facts in 
order to speed the trial along. One of those facts was: "the basis for your [plaintiffs] claim on the 
property is a fence line and chicken coop." The plaintiff contends that this stipulation does not prevent 
it from contending that its claim is also based on the ditch. In essence, the plaintiff wants to rewrite the 
stipulation to read: "the basis for plaintiffs claim on the property is a fence line and chicken coop and a 
ditch." The issue is whether the plaintiffs addition to the stipulation is barred by the stipulation as 
written and accepted by the plaintiff. 
"A stipulation will be construed like other contracts or written instruments inter partes'" Yeargim 
Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n. 2001 UT 11, 20 P.3d 287 at ^39 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). "In interpreting a contract, we look to the writing itself to ascertain 
the parties1 intentions . . , If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract 
may be interpreted as a matter of law." WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88, 54 
P.3d 1139 at TIKI8, 19 (Utah 2002). 
This issue is governed by one of the fundamental maxims of contract interpretation: expressio unius 
estexclusio alterium, which means "the expression of one is the exclusion of the other." The application of 
this maxim has recently been explained as: "If the parties in their contract have specifically named on 
item or if they have specifically enumerated several items of a larger class, a reasonable inference is that 
they did not intend to include other, similar items not listed." 5 Margaret A. KnifFin, Corbin on Contracts, 
Revised Edition, §24.28 (1998). 
Applying this maxim to this stipulation, the plaintiff agreed that the bases for its claim are the 
fence and the chicken coop. The ditch was not included, and the presumption is that the parties did not 
intend to include the ditch and the plain tiff acknowledged that it had no claims based on the ditch. If 
the plaintiff thought it had more bases for its claim, it should either have had them included in the 
stipulation or not agreed to the stipulation. Having agreed to the stipulation, the plaintiff is bound by it 
and cannot rewrite the stipulation because it now believes that its claims will fail if it is not allowed to 
add evidence about the ditch. 
Furthermore, even if the court were to disregard the parties' stipulation and consider the 
plaintiffs evidence regarding the ditch, the evidence is insufficient to establish a boundary based on the 
ditch. 
The plaintiff has not established that the location of the fence was certain and definite. Norris 
Watkins, who grew up on the Hughes' property, indicated that this ditch moved throughout the years. 
Furthermore, the Utah courts have indicated that shallow ditches like the ones the plaintiff relies on do 
not make good lines for boundary by acquiescence purposes: 
Since the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence can deprive a record owner of his 
property, a court should be reluctant to hold that a ditch, which was constantly subject to 
shifting or obliteration by erosion, weeds or cleaning and which was originally established 
by plowing two furrows down an open field for purposes of irrigation, has that visibility 
and persistency of placement to constitute a boundary by acquiescence, which we have 
observed must be definite, certain and not speculative.... There is certainly insufficient 
evidence that the ditch was constructed to mark the boundary. 
FuocoII.421P.2dat947. 
In addition, the purpose of this ditch was clearly irrigation. All of the witnesses testified that the 
purpose of the ditch was irrigation and there had been no water in the ditch since 1994. No one has 
maintained the ditch since that time, because there was no purpose in doing so. "The evidence 
presented shows the ditch was used for irrigation purposes and the record is void of any evidence 
showing that the plaintiffs1 predecessors ever acquiesced in it as a boundary line; therefore, the first issue 
[boundary by acquiescence] must be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs." Fuoco v. Williams. 389 P.2d 
143, 145 (Utah 1964) ("Fuoco I"), 
V. THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING ANY 
BOUNDARY WHICH INCLUDES PORTIONS OF THE HUGHES5 
DRIVEWAY. 
The final issue the court asked the parties to address was whether the plaintiffs actions estop it 
from claiming a boundary which encloses a portion of the Hughes' driveway. The Hughes5 testimony 
was that the plaintiff did not inform them of its boundary claim until after the Hughes had completed 
the driveway. 
Estoppel has been defined as "a bar which precludes a person from denying or asserting anything 
to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the truth, either by the 
acts of judicial or legislative officers, or by his own deed, acts, or representations, either express or 
implied." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver §1. 
Equitable estoppel requires proof of three elements: (I) a statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or 
inaction by the other party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act. 
Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services. Inc., 1999 UT 100, 989 P.2d 1077 at f$4 (Utah 1999). The most 
important aspect of these elements for the purposes of this case is that an estoppel may be based on a 
failure to act as well as an affirmative act. 
All of these elements are present in this matter. First, although the plaintiff was aware that the 
Hughes were installing a brick driveway,3 it did nothing to inform the Hughes that it claimed an interest 
in the property on which the driveway was being constructed. This failure to act may be the basis of an 
estoppel under Utah law. Furthermore, the plaintiffs silence in the face of the Hughes' construction of 
3The uncontroverted evidence is that Van Dahl lives across the street from the Hughes 
and it took the Hughes several months to complete the brick driveway. 
die driveway is clearly inconsistent with the plaintiffs present claim that it owns a portion of this 
property. 
The Hughes reasonably relied on this failure to act in continuing to construct the driveway. The 
reasonableness of the Hughes' reliance is shown in the plaintiffs stipulation that the disputed property is 
contained in the Hughes' legal description. Since the property was in their legal description and no one 
had informed them of adverse claims, the Hughes would have no reason to believe that there was any 
problem in building the driveway. 
Finally, the Hughes will suffer injury if the plaintiff is allowed to change its position after the 
driveway is built. The Hughes have invested significant funds and work in building the driveway. In 
addition, the driveway is required for the operation of the Hughes' in-home business. 
The Hughes have established an estoppel and the court should not permit the plaintiff to claim a 
boundary for this property which includes any portion of the Hughes' driveway. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs boundary by acquiescence claim must fail. The plaintiff has failed to establish the 
boundary with the certainty and definiteness necessary to support a claim of boundary by acquiescence. 
Orton v. Carter does not change the rule that the boundary must be definitely established-it merely 
shows the court's satisfaction that the boundary had been established under the facts of that case. The 
plaintiff has also failed to establish that the parties mutually acquiesced in the fence that they claim as a 
boundary or that the fence was intended to establish a boundary. Furthermore, §78-12-5 requires the 
plaintiff to bring an action within seven years of the time it last possessed the property and it has 
presented insufficient evidence to refute the presumption that the Hughes and their predecessors in 
interest possessed the property contained in their legal description. For this same reason, the undisputed 
fact that the fence existed from 1925 to 1965 is irrelevant. In addition, the plaintiff waived the right to 
claim a boundary by acquiescence based on the ditch when it stipulated that its claims were based on the 
fence and the chicken coop. Even if the court allows the plaintiff to make a claim based on the ditch, the 
plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to support that claim. Finally, the plaintiff is estopped 
from claiming any portion of the Hughes' driveway by its failure to inform the Hughes of its claims 
during the construction of the driveway. 
DATED this J j [ _ day of May, 2003. 
Keith M. Backman 
Attorney for the Hughes 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this of May, I mailed and faxed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing post-trial brief to: Carvel R. Shaffer, attorney for plaintiff, as follows: 
By US Mail to: 562 S. Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
By fax to: (801)298-1576 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAHL INVESTMENT CO., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WAYNE L. HUGHES, SR. and PATRICIA L. 
HAMPTON-HUGHES, 
Defendants 
WAYNE L. HUGHES, SR. and PATRICIA L. 
HAMPTON-HUGHES, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PROGRESSIVE, L.C., 
Third Party Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 010602740 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This matter came on for trial on April 4, 2003 and for closing argument on May 20, 2003, and 
on a hearing for clarification hearing on October 28, 2003. Plaintiff was represented by Van Dahl and it 
attorney, Carvel Shaffer. Defendants were present and represented by their attorney, Keith M. 
Backman at the trial and clarification hearing. The Third-Party Defendant did not appear at either the 
trial or the closing arguments. The court, having reviewed the evidence and the 
arguments of the parties, hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
HNDINGSOFFACT 
1. This matter involves claims of boundary by acquiescence made by plaintiff ("the Dahls") 
against the defendants ("the Hughes") and the Hughes against the third-party defendant ("Progressive"). 
2. The properties involved in this matter are the Dahl Property, located at 1752 W. 1700 
South; the Hughes Property, located at 1782 W. 1700 South; and the Progressive Property, located at 
1792 W. 1700 South, all in Syracuse, Utah. 
3. All of the properties are adjacent to each other. 
4. The Dahls rent the Dahl Property to tenants. Van Dahl lives across the street from the 
Hughes. 
5. For more than 20 years, the Hughes and their predecessors in interest have occupied a 
portion of the Progressive Property up to a line marked by a driveway which is approximately 1 foot west 
of a telephone pole on the west side of the Hughes Property. 
6. The Hughes and Progressive, as well as their respective predecessors in interest, have 
mutually acquiesced in the driveway as the dividing line between the Hughes Property and the 
Progressive Property. 
7. Some time before 1925, a fence was erected on the Hughes property, approximately 18 
feet west of the property line as defined by the legal description between the Hughes5 property and the 
Dahl property. 
8. This fence was used to contain the Dahl's cattle on their side of the fence. 
9. The Dahls maintained cattle on the property up to the fence line until approximately 
1965 when the property on the Dahls' side of the fence became contaminated and the cattle had to be 
moved elsewhere. 
10. The Dahls did not maintain the fence after the cattle were moved. 
11. During the time from 1925 to 1965, the Dahls and the Hughes' predecessors in interest 
mutually acquiesced in the fence as the property line between the two properties. 
12. The fence deteriorated before the Hughes bought their property in 1998, 
13. In approximately 1999, the Hughes began to build a driveway on their property and a 
portion of the driveway was on property which had been on the Dahls' side of the old fence line. 
14. The Dahls were aware that the Hughes were building the driveway shortly after the 
Hughes commenced work on the driveway in 1999. 
15. The driveway was not completed for approximately 18 months. 
16. During the construction period, the Dahls failed to inform the Hughes of their claim to a 
portion of the property upon which the Hughes were building the driveway. 
17. After the driveway was completed, the Dahls informed the Hughes that they claimed a 
portion of the property on which the driveway was built and marked the driveway with spray paint to 
the point that the Dahls claimed the property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Hughes are entitled to a default judgment against Progressive. 
2. In the alternative, the Hughes have established a boundary by acquiescence between the 
Hughes Property and the Progressive Property. 
3. The boundary line between the Hughes Property and the Progressive Property is the old 
driveway which still exists and which is approximately 1 foot west of a telephone pole which runs along 
the west side of the Hughes Property. 
4. The Dahls have established a boundary by acquiescence between the Dahl Property and 
that Hughes Property. The boundary line is the old fence line between the properties. 
5. The Hughes raised a statute of limitations defense to the Dahls5 claim of boundary by 
acquiescence based on Utah Code Ann. §78-12-5. The court finds that this statute has no application to 
this case. Once the fence had been in existence for 20 continuous years, it became the boundary 
between the properties and it is immaterial whether the Dahls occupied the property in the seven years 
prior to filing this action. 
6. The court finds that the Dahls are estopped from claiming that portion of the disputed 
property between the Hughes Property and the Dahl Property on which the Hughes built the driveway. 
a. The Dahls' silence during the construction of the driveway is inconsistent with 
their claim that they owned a portion of the property on which the driveway was being built; 
b. The Hughes reasonably relied on the Dahls5 silence to continue working on the 
driveway; and 
c. The Hughes would incur damages if the Dahls were permitted to change their 
position. 
The estoppel applies only to that portion of the property on which the Hughes installed 
pavers and creates a jogged line between the two properties. 
7. There is no basis for an award of attorney's fees or costs to the Dahls. 
8. The Hughes are entitled to recover their costs from Progressive. 
DATED this ;2003. 
</jyUA 
Thomas L. Kay 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, Keith M. Backman, attorney for defendants 
Wayne & Patricia Hughes, will submit this order to the Judge for his signature upon the expiration of 
five (5) days from the date of this notice, together with three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection 
is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Please 
govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this _ Z _ day of November, 2003. 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
KEITH M. BACKMAN 
Attorney for Defendants Wayne & Patricia Hughes 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law this / day of November, 2003 to: Carvel R. Shaffer, Attorney for Plaintiffs, at 
562 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAHL INVESTMENT CO., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WAYNE L. HUGHES, SR. and PATRICIA L. 
HAMPTON-HUGHES, 
Defendants 
WAYNE L. HUGHES, SR. and PATRICIA L. 
HAMPTON-HUGHES, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PROGRESSIVE, L.C, 
Third Party Defendant. 
ORDER 
Order 
VD11381716 
010602740 HUGHES,WAYNE SR 
Case No. 010602740 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
This matter came on for trial on April 4, 2003, for closing argument on May 20, 2003 and on a 
clarification hearing on October 28, 2003. Plaintiff was represented by Van Dahl and its attorney, 
Carvel Shaffer. Defendants were present and represented by their attorney, Keith M. Backman. The 
Third-Party Defendant did not appear at either the trial or the closing arguments. The court, having 
entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law hereby enters its order in this matter as follows: 
1. The boundary line between the Hughes Property and the Progressive Property is a line 
marked by a driveway which is approximately 1 foot west of a telephone pole on the western edge of the 
Hughes Property. 
2. The boundary line between the Hughes Property and the Dahl Property is along an old 
fence line which was taken down prior to 1998; provided that the Dahls are estopped from claiming any 
of the property occupied by the Hughes' driveway. This decision creates a jogged boundary line between 
the Hughes and Dahl properties. 
3. Neither the Dahls nor the Hughes are entitled to recover costs or attorney's fees from the 
other party. 
4. The Hughes are entitled to recover their costs of the third-party complaint from 
Progressive. 
2 
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, Keith M. Backman, attorney for defendants 
Wayne & Patricia Hughes, will submit this order to the Judge for his signature upon the expiration of 
five (5) days from the date of this notice, together with three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection 
is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Please 
govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this 7 day of November, 2003. 
HELGESEN, WATERFALL & JONES 
KEITH M. BACKMAN 
Attorney for Defendants Wayne & Patricia Hughes 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order this *--^ eay of 
November, 2003 to: Carvel R. Shaffer, Attorney for Plaintiffs, at 562 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 
84010. 
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rrrrasu > ^/J^uu^^^n^C^ grantee of -t&^as&^si^jVcfs^^ 
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STATE OF UTAH, \ 
y^ or 
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/ Yv J)) " Notary Public. 
led at request of 9 h J ^ i U L ^ - - X ^ ^ / JUHAW'7£%L\Wf , at 9. ¥° o'clock^ M., 
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38805 WARRANTY DEED 
Thomas J. Thurgood and Elizabeth R. Thurgood, his wife, Grantors of Syracuse, 
nty of Davis, State of Utah, hereby convey and warrant to Earl W. Dahl and Evaline 
L1, Grantees, of Syracuse, County of Davis, State of Utah, for the sura of One Dollarf 
> following described tract of land in Davis County, State of Utah: 
Beginning Seventy-three (73) rods West from the Southeast corner of the Southwest 
irter (SW^) of Section 10, Township 4 North, Range 2 West, Salt lake Meridian, United 
Ltes Survey; running thence West thirteen (13) rods; thence North Seventy-nine (79) 
Ls; thence East thirteen (13) rods; thence South Seventy-nine (79) rods to place of 
?inningi containing six and one-half (&i) acres, more or less. 
WITNESS, the hands of the Grantors this 15th day of January, A.D. 1923* 
gned in the presence of: Thos. J. Thurgood. 
Vird Cook. Elizabeth R. Thurgood. 
ate of Utah 0 
ss 
vis County J 
On the 15th day of January, A.D. 1923, personally appeared before me Thomas J. 
urgood and Elizabeth R. Thurgood, his wife, the signors of the above instrument, who 
ly acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
commission expires: ^ Vird Cook, 
Jeb. 22nd, 1924. seal\ j\ Notary Public. 
~" / lay ton, Utah. 
jcorded January 28th, 1926 at 12:55 P.M. Abstracted Jj 
'7 ' ' ' 
J f,c< tJ-l "\ W ^ * "Vx~T?- County Recorder. 
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Thomas J . Thurgood and Oerda If* Thurgood Gmtn„rB 
WARRANT to Marl M. Thurgood 
r « , . # . • Urunt IT 
-I Syraouse County of Davia . State of Utah, for the sum of 
.i , , . , _, ,. . one DOLLARS. 
the followlnf described tract of land in Davia County, state of ufah: 
Beginning at a point 86 rode west of the southeast corner of the 
oouthweat quarter of aeotion 10, township 4 norths Z west. s. 1, 
nu, N# Running thence north GO rode, thence west 3#40 chains^ 
Thence aouth 80 rods, thence east 3.40 ohainB to joint of beg-
inning, containing 6.635 aoros, with all outbuilding, ditch rights, 
m d water rights annortaininK to thn «bove dppmribed property. 
WITNESS the hand of Mid Grantor . this / > / day of ^ / U t t d O . 13. 19 4* 
Signed in the presence of » J t f f H f M ^ 
Ttfeux 4c£*Z&#Zu. jlij ^ 
STATE OP UTAH I 
County 
On the y </ day of *£^^A.1),,4**£\ personally 
/ he^ executed the name. y^s'iyfo-ym • 
iviorom i_, ^ QQ 
iporcu ft tnlorod ^ L ^ t ! ^ * * ^ l,P,M flg^ J ^ 
Aikwuu b, 0«)EN BOARD OF REALTORS (Ut« Wiek tTHvrlltt tibfctn 
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"365209 . WARRANTY DEED >-y/«M»••?*> 
alsoknown as Mori r/iuraood . „ . „ , » „ , 
MERL M.THURGOOland B£JTr C. rWl/flGOOO, huiband and wfft 0 R ^ » S 
- mtyot Oavls SUU of UUh hereby CONVEY «nd 
I «.nan<3 wtth full rtghts of survivorship and not as tenants in common. 
I GRANTEES 
j of o g d . „ County of. " .o .r ^ SUf of Utah, for thjjumrf 
fen Dollars and oth.r good and valuabe cons frf.rattons » « » . ? 5 T ^ h | the following described tract of land It. W County, SUt . of Utah. 
I Beginning at a point 86 rods West from the Southeast corner of theSouth- I 
*\ west Ooarier of Section 10, Township 4 Worth, flange 2 West, Salt {**• 
| Meridian, running thence North 190 feett thence West 90 feett thence South 
I 190 feet; thence East 90 feet to the place of beginning. 
S WITNESS the hand* of said Grantors , this *5th day of March A. D. 19 58 
Signed in the presence of ^ ^ . M ^ 4 - -
,d tl 
STATE OF UTAH 1
 0 n t h e 15th day of March A. D. 195fl 
County of Weber ("• 
J> Personally appeared before me MERL u. THUmooo and BETTY c. THURQOOO 
1 the eigne* of the within Instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that *he y executed the 
iblic) 
/ j Residing at I j Ogden, Utah 
My Commission Expires August 11, 1960\ (Notary Seil) 
(Un black typtwrlUr ribbon only) 
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WAYNE L. HUGHES SR. 
1782 WEST 1700 SOUTH 
SYRACUSE, UT 
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REC'D FOR ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY 
E l s i e W. T a y l o r , T r u s t e e o f The E l s i e W. T a y l o r F a m i l y P r o t e c t i o n 
T r u s t d a t e d the 1 1 t h day o f March, 1 9 9 6 , 
grantor, 
of . .a / ton, County of Davis, S t a t s of Utah, 
h
°rw£y CONVEY and WARRANT tc 
Wayne L. Hughes S r . And P a t r i c i a L. Hampton - Hughes , Husband and Wife 
a s J o i n t Tenants w i t h F u l l R i g h t s o f S u r v i v o r s h i p 
grantee . 
of SYRACUSE. County of DAVIS, S t a t e of Utah, 
for che sum of Ten do l l a r s ar.d o the r good and va luable cons idera t ion , 
the following t r ac t of land in DAVTS County, 
S t a t e of Utah, t o - v i t : 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 86 RODS WEST FROM THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF 
THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 1 0 , TOWNSHIP 4 NORTH, RANGE 2 
WEST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN. THENCE NORTH 190 FEET, WEST 90 FEET, 
SOUTH 190 FEET, TKENCE EAST 90 FEET TO BEGINNING. 
Subject to easements r e s t r i c t i o n s ard r i g h t s of way appearing of record or enforceable in 
law and equity anc 1998 taxes and t h e r e a f t e r . 
WITNESS the hand cf said g ran to r , chia 14th day of October. 1998. 
Signed in the presence of ~?~Z ,*„,-
ELSIE W. TAYLOR, TRUSTEE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
On the 14tn cay of October. 1996, persona l ly appearec before me 
ELSIE W. TAYLOR, TRUSTEE OF THE 
ELSIE W. TAYLOR FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST DATED THE 11TH DAY OF MARCH, 
1 9 9 6 , 
the s igne r ( s ) of the foregoing instrument , who duly acknowledged to me 
t h a t she executed the same m t h e i r capac i ty and by au tho r i t y given 
under the terms of sa ic t r u s t . . s? 
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ACCOMODATION 
O' 
BOUNDARY LINE AGREEMEMls WHAUER, MVIS^WPICSRDEB16* 
1997 KAft 21 llsflO At! FEE 12.00 SEP Iff 
REC'D FOR SECURITY TITLE ( W COflPtfiY
The parties hereto, Syracuse City, a Utah Municipal Corporation, and C and H 
Associates, agree that the following property line description shall hereafter constitute 
the boundary line between property located in Davis County, Utah, owned by Syracuse 
City, which property is on the West of this line {the property owned by Syracuse is more 
fully described in the attached exhibit "A1') and property owned by and C and H 
Associates, which property is on the East of this line (the property owned by C and H is 
more fully described in the attached exhibit MBW): 
Beginning at the intersection of a fence line projection running North to South 
and the South line of said point being South 89° 58' 46" West 1437.10 feet along 
the section line and North 00 s 09* 27" East 294.00 feet from the Southeast 
Corner of the Southwest Quarter of Section 10, Township 4 North, Range 2 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running: thence North 00° 09' 27" East 
1025.00 feet to and along the said fence line to the pcint of termination. 
| ^ - O S > - ' O O U ^ ) O O M 7 J 0 0 ? 0 , 0 0 ^ 
This boundary line agreement shall have the effect of a quit claim deed between 
the parties divesting any ownership interest by Syracuse City of any claim in any 
property immediately to the East of the line described above and divesting any 
ownership interest by C and H Associates of any claim in any property immediately to 
the West of the line described above. 
Dated this .day of LLLMU 
/ 
Michael R. Garrett, Mayor 
Syracuse City 
-, 1997. 
9 
-^YsJ ?<?CL>A / 
Blake N. Hazen, Managing Partner 
C and H Associates 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
) 
:ss 
) 
On the 1 7 day of /-th , 1997, personally appeared before me 
BLAKE N HAZEN, Managing Partner of C and H Associates, the signer of the above 
instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same 
^ - ^ X J M I C BL MOVES 
A £ ^ N & § V NOrJWPW£*BTAlBlitmH 
114* W£$T 1240 SOUTH 
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.lj*i PY 1 ITLE CO. WARRANTY DEED 
DAHL INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah Lijnrited P a r t n e r s h i p , 
of Syracuse , County of Davis 
COXVKY and WARRANT ^ciJlASS0CUXESt 
grantoi 
, Stale of Utah, heieby 
E 1 2 1 9 1 0 7 B 1 9 5 1 P 1 5 7 3 
CAROL DEAN PAGEf DAVIS CHTY RECORDER 
1995 DEC 27 4:34 Pit FEE 10.GO DE? DJU 
REC'D FOR SECURITY TITLE COHPAKY 
1133 North Nayou, #6 gnuitee 
ofLayton, Utah 84040 County of Davis ,Su<ite of Utah, for the sum of 
TEN DOLLARS and other good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s > the following described tract 
of land in Davis County, State of Utah: 
Beginning a t a point West a long t h e Sec t ion l i n e 1276,5 f e e t and North 133 f e e t 
and West 142.5 f e e t , more or l e s s , t o the West l i n e of p rope r ty conveyed by Deed 
recorded as Entry No. 525338, and North along t h e West l i n e of sa id p rope r ty 
546.613 f e e t from the South Q u a r t e r corner of S e c t i o n 10, Township 4 North , Range 
2 West, S a l t Lake Meridian, i n t h e Ci ty of Syracuse , and running thence North 
640.387 . f e e t , more or l e s s , t o a p o i n t 80 rods North of the South l i n e of t he 
Southwest Quar ter of s a i d S e c t i o n 10; thence E a s t 13 r o d s ; thence South 640.387 
f e e t , more or l e s s , to a p o i n t E a s t of the p o i n t of beg inn ing ; thence West 13 
rods t o the po in t of b e g i n n i n g . 
SUBJECT TO easements, r e s t r i c t i o n s and r e s e r v a t i o n s of r eco rd . 
P t . 12-052-0063 
WITNESS, Die hand of said grantor , this 
December . A. D. 10 95, 
27th 'lav of 
t DAHL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a JLtah Limited P a r t n e r s h i p 
o / / «^  f) 
J By: , '/<<£ l<? / X k^SJ? 
VEKL T. DAHL, General Pa r tne r 
M A I L OF UTAH, 
County of Davis 
S3. 
' LEEIiiFSKPi??^ MEMO -
WhENPSCBVEO m 
On '.he 27tii flay of December , A. V 1995, 
I>ciM,/Kt!h uppi'ared Imfoiv rn<: VFJR1. T. DAHL, General P a r t n e r of 0M1L 1 NVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah LIraJted P a r t n e r s h i p , 
th" -urnrt 'il Lhe within instrument, why duly ;i know lodged U> me th»i t he executed the 
. a trie. 
>7 f- / / --> 
/ / A / / / / 
Notary \\\\ ji,-
<:omm i «;<» \ on Exp I res : Oct. 31 , 1996 
Residing in. ranningTcn, JjjyjjT^LlJ— 
f PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT EXHIBIT NO. ffl ~? 1 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
*ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
On the ,j?4 day of '/?€(> 
-E-13-11517- fi210Sf %&!?• 
1997, personally appeared before me 
MICHAEL R. GARRETT, who being by me duly sworn did say that he» the said 
MICHAEL R. GARRETT, is the Mayor of Syracuse City, and thai the within and 
foregoing instrument was signed on behalf of the said Syracuse City £7 authority of the 
City Council of Syracuse City, and said MICHAEL R. GARRETT duly acknowledged to 
me that the said Syracuse City executed the same and that the seal affixed is the seal 
of the said Syracuse City. 
)TARY PUBLIC 
A M G H A U . 
J 
/ T / i " T-r 
«' / J . V 
,t* 
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ADDENDUM 15 
~/<L0V. J 
? 
t i n L U « L K r u t v i i u n run ruun KLUUKLO 
>rty Description (not for Jj»§*Udocuments)~T 
< BEG AT A PT 7pR0DS W FR THE SE COR OF THE SW 1/4 OF <jrT. 10-T4N-R2W. SLM; & RUN 
TH W 13 RODS, TH N 80 RODS; TH E 13 RODS; TH S 80 RODS TO THE POB. CONT LESS ST 
REET. ALSO LESS TO 1900-1039. CONT. 3 .509 ACRES (WENT TO 12-052-0064) 
'roperty Address 1752 WEST 1700 SOUTH SYRACUSE 
Value of Property Distribution of General Taxes 
Type Taxable Valuq Market Value Eff. Tax Rate Taxing Unit Tax Ratd Amount 
AGRICULTURAL 
IESIDENTIAL 
17,040 
29,310 
1 7 , 0 4 0 
5 3 , 2 9 0 
.003534 
.001348 
.001287 
.000691 
.000363 
.000212 
.000102 
.000044 
.000461 
.000055 
.000171 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
ST UNIFORM SCH FUND 
DAVIS COUNTY 
SYRACUSE CITY 
COUNTY BOND FUND 
COUNTY LIBRARY 
WEBER WATER DIST. 
MOSQUITO ABATEMENT 
NO.DAVIS SEWER DIST 
CNTY ASSESS & COLL 
STATE ASSESS & COLL 
.005362 
.002046 
.001953 
.001048 
.000551 
.000321 
.000154 
.000066 
.000700 
.000084 
.000260 
46,350 70,330 .012545 
248.54 
94.83 
90.52 
48.57 
25.54 
14.88 
14 
06 
32.44 
3.89 
12.05 
.008268 581.46 
Delinquent Information 
'axes are Delinquent at 5:00 P.M. Dec. 2, 1996. 
rate statute prevents the County Treasurer from accepting payment 
' current years taxes between DEC. 3 and DEC 13. Payments 
jceived between DEC. 13, 1996 and JAN. 1, 1997 oust Include a 
percent or S10.00 penalty, whichever 1s greater, 
'ter JAN 1, 1997, 1nt erest is charged at the 
tte defined by state statute 59-2-1331. 
Adjustments To Taxes 
Y>* //on** .1&4 I3rf r HZ*? 
Total Adjustments : 
Total General Taxes : 
Total Payments : 
$.00 
$581.46 
$.00 
1996 Tax Balance Due: $581.46 
Name : 
Serial # : 
Loan Company : 
DAHL INVESTMENT COMPANY 
12:052:0063 ( 54) 
ilure to receive tax notice does not excuse penalty or Interest. This office is not responsible if you pay taxes on property other than your own. Newly 
rchased property i s the tax responsibility of the buyer. If this property was subdivided or combined, other delinquencies may apply which do not appear on 
Is notice. Make check payable to DAVIS COUNTY TREASURER and return to Box 618, FARHINGTON. UTAH 84025. Payments made by mail roust be POSTMARKED no later 
m Dec. 2. 1996. Our office hours are Mon-Fri 8:30-5:00. Your taxes may be paid by your loan company. 
ADDENDUM 16 

ADDENDUM 17 

ADDENDUM 18 
1 , THE COURT: Okay, you may be seated. May this 
2 ' witness be excused? 
3 | MR. BACKMAN: Could we have a short break now, Your 
4 Honor, would that be okay, Your Honor? 
5 | THE COURT: Sure. Let's take a 10-minute break and 
6 I come back at 10:25. 
7 | (Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: The parties are all back. 
9 j Mr. Shaffer, if you'd like to call your next witness. 
10 j MR. SHAFFER: Your Honor, I have nothing else for Mr. 
11 ! Hazen so he may leave. 
12 THE COURT: Okay, alright thank you. 
13 MR. SHAFFER: I'd like to call Mr. Evan Dahle please. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. If you'd like to come forward and 
15 be sworn. 
16 EVAN DAHLE 
17 j having first been duly sworn, testified 
i 
18 upon his oath as follows: 
i 
19 J DIRECT EXAMINATION 
20 j BY MR. SHAFFER: 
21 j Q Could you please state your name? 
22 j A Evan Dahle. 
23 Q And what is your occupation, Mr. Dahle? 
24 | A I'm retired. 
25 Q And what was your occupation before that? 
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like that. I told them exactly what my experience had been and 
that I kind of held, you know, a position that I was just, you 
know, I held a position that the fence line was where I put the 
chainlink fence and the reason I did that is because it was 
establishing a line that was obviously there in my opinion. 
MR. BACKMAN: Okay. I don't have any other 
questions. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHAFFER: 
Q Mr. Hazen, you say that in your experience of buying 
and selling and developing land it's typical that you have the 
fence line become the boundary line; is that correct? 
A For me, yes it is because I just feel like that's 
something that I kind of say. If a farmer has been there and 
it's established, I just go by that. Sometimes I'll loose 
property because maybe there's an overlap and sometimes I'll 
gain it. 
MR. SHAFFER: Okay. That's all I have. 
Your Honor, I would like to ask that these two 
pictures, Exhibit 16 and 17 be admitted, if 1 could please. 
MR. BACKMAN: Your Honor, I don't think he's laid 
sufficient foundation for those. We have no idea when they 
were taken, we have no idea who took them. 
MR. SHAFFER: (inaudible) to either one. That's all. 
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that was a discussion I had when we went over and talked to 
what was it the surveyor or the county - help me on this, was 
it the county surveyor? Yeah. 
Q Who went to that meeting? 
A That would have been myself -I'm not sure. 
You weren't there were you, sir? 
THE COURT: You need to answer to the best of your 
recollection. 
THE WITNESS: Ifm sorry I apologize. Myself, Mr. 
Dahle, and whatever their names are now. 
Q (BY MR. BACKMAN) The Hughes? 
A Hughes. 
Q Okay. And you guys discussed the line? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Did you guys discuss getting a survey to establish 
the line? 
A I didn't, no. * I felt like I was kind of out of the 
deal and I was just there telling them what I had done. 
Q So all you were doing was advising them about what 
you'd done with Syracuse City? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And you weren't involved in any conversations between 
them? 
A Yes, I was. I talked to them quite a bit about what 
my experience had been on property lines and gaps and things 
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west because of the gap on the west and that also, if it means 
anything, that also happened to me on the east end of the 
property of Darth Thurgood's. There was a little bit of shift 
too. 
MR. SHAFFER: That's all. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. BACKMAN: Yeah, just a couple of questions. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BACKMAN: 
Q When you did this subdivision did you guys do a 
survey? 
A We did. 
Q Did you have any problems with the survey? 
A Probably not a lot of problems. Do you mean other 
than what I'm used to? 
Q Tell me what you're used to and I'll— 
A I'm used to anything. I would probably say it was 
pretty clean.^ This is pretty typical, this kind of stuff where 
the fence line is. That's relatively typical for me to run 
into a gap or maybe an overlap and you have to solve that 
problem. That's very typical. 
Q Okay, Did you have any discussion with Van Dahle 
about the boundary line? 
A We did after - I'm sorry I refer to her as Hampton's 
because I know her from way back but they actually called and 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SHMTER; 
Q I hate to keep belaboring this but as far as the 
remnants of that fence, are you saying it was right by the 
chicken coop or near the chicken coop or to the south or the 
north of the chicken coop? 
A I'm saying it's north of the chicken coop. I can 
remember it being north of the chicken coop and I can remember 
it being west of the chicken coop because we were using that as 
a line of sight to come from the north. So just in a 
surveyor's mind, okay, we were looking at that and I do not 
remember looking all the way down to the street because we felt 
that we had to go beyond where our fence was going to end to 
get a straight line and I can remember seeing the chicken coop 
and a piece of fence and that's all I can remember seeing and 
just remember saying that's where we'll establish that straight 
line so that we can put our fence up, 
Q When you communicated with Syracuse on putting this 
boundary line together, they were not giving up any land that 
I they claimed, is that correct? 
! A Well, they did it very - and I didn't really get into 
j a lot of conversation with them. It was my engineer that got 
into the real conversation but they had no qualms with it 
, because they felt like they were still receiving the same 
1
 property that they were because everything was shifted to the 
55 
Q But your best estimate is the last remnant of fence 
that you saw was about 200 feet from the road? 
A Probably could be. I would say it was - wherever 
that chicken coop is? It was kind of just behind that maybe 
like ten or 15 feet. 
Q Ten or 15 feet beyond the chicken coop? 
A Yeah, give or - maybe 20. I'm Rind of guessing. I 
don't know where the chicken coop is. I can just remember 
seeing the - I can remember seeing the little post and some 
barbed wire kind of hanging there down and could see the 
chicken coop in the background. 
Q But you don't remember any other fence beyond that 
over to the south it would be? 
A Nope, just that the barbed wire was in that direction 
is all that I can say that I would know. 
Q Do you know if the chicken coop is on your P7 6 or the 
Dahle's P68? 
A I don't. My assumption would be - I don't know. 
MR. BACKMAN: Okay. 
MR. SHAFFER: I didn't understand that question. 
What was the question? 
MR. BACKMAN: Whether the chicken coop was on his 
property or not. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
/// 
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happy to come do that for nothing and keep the weeds down for 
us and bale it and they bale all this right here too that we 
purchased. So it's all kind of, maybe it's like a grass hay. 
I better not say because I just don't know enough about farming 
other than I know that the people, they're happy to do it. 
Q You've got people who are happy to come and chop it, 
mow it and haul it off? 
A Right. 
Q And that's all you know? 
A That's all. 
Q That's sufficient. You looked, when you were doing 
this, you looked down at the intersection, the line at 47 and 
76, right? 
A ' Right. 
Q And you saw a remnant of fence in that area, right? 
A Yeah, and I would probably say it's probably like, if 
that's 190, it's got to have been just maybe somewhere in this 
area because all we were doing was establishing a straight line 
and if you established a straight line right there and that 
happened to be off, then this whole thing would be off. But if 
you establish beyond that, then you run a straight line. 
Q Got it. But you didn't see any remnants of fence on 
the intersection between 0006 and-
A I couldn't tell you whether it was that intersection 
or not because I don't know where those are. 
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A Nobody else was a party to it. 
Q Just C & H and Syracuse City. 
A With Syracuse City. 
Q All right. And that was just to correct this 
confusion about boundary lines, right? 
A Exactly. 
Q And when you got there and looked at the property 
that you were buying, you saw that there was just remnants of 
fence? 
A That's right. In fact the reason - that's the reason 
why there's a little bit of confusion on how I told you about 
right down here on this Parcel 47, the reason we had to look 
beyond that is so that we could make sure that this point and 
whatever it went beyond, we didn't miss it. 
Q Okay. 
A And that's the reason I... 
Q Did you see any crops being actively cultivated on 
this property? 
A That's the reason I didn't really actively look at 
it. I'm just saying what is here now is, what's on it right 
now is what was on it when I bought it and — 
Q You don't know if that's a crop of just grass or 
weeds? 
A I think it's more than grass and weeds because we 
continue still to bale it and chop it and people are still 
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A No. 
Q So you're not here to tell us about the historical 
uses of the fence and all that other stuff, right? 
A No. 
Q Okay. When you did the boundary agreement with 
Syracuse City, Exhibit 6, the purpose of that was to clarify 
the boundary line, right? 
A Yeah, that's exactly right because I didn't know 
where to put the fence up. 
Q Okay. Syracuse City requires you to put a fence 
around a subdivision, is that what you're telling us? 
A It depends on the piece of property that is behind 
the subdivision, depending on its use, but yes, in this 
particular case, yes, to that point where I put it down there. 
Q But the legal description - the problem was as I 
understand it and you've explained it was that the legal 
description said one thing and there was the fence line which 
seemed to indicate something else. The Dahles were not a party 
to this agreement were they? 
A Which agreement? 
Q The boundary line agreement? 
A That's correct. 
23 | Q And the Hughes were not a party to this agreement? 
i 
24 A I don't think the Hughes were around at that time. 
25 I Q Were the Taylors a party to it? 
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THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. BACKMAN: Is seven the warranty deed? 
MR. SHAFFER: Seven is the warranty deed, 6 is the 
boundary line agreement. 
MR. BACKMAN: I have no objection. 
THE COURT: Six and seven are received. 
Do you have any further questions of this witness? 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 6 and 7 received) 
MR. SHAFFER: Not right now Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, cross examination? 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BACKMAN: 
Q Okay. You talk about a gap in this fence line when 
you were talking with Mr. Shaffer. Can you explain to me what 
you mean by a gap in the fence line? 
A It would be just like this one on the west side of 
the Syracuse property. It would look just like that but it was 
over here. So see, there was a gap on both sides. 
Q So there was a gap between the legal description and 
that fence line? 
A That's right. 
Q That's what you're talking about? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q You didn't have any involvement in this property 
prior to 1995, did you? 
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know there was fence posts down beyond— 
A Beyond this point where it jogs right here at the 225 
mark, yes, there was something beyond there but see this 
belonged to somebody else and I wasn't required to put a fence 
down there so I didn't get into it real heavy. 
Q So the boundary line then that you (inaudible) where 
fence line on the map is where (inaudible). It comes down and 
then it jogs. So the boundary line moved to the west down to 
the south boundary of your property then that you purchased, 
(inaudible)* 
A Parcel 47 and Parcel 76, if you look, you come down 
to that point right there, that's the end of my fence, okay, 
and so — 
Q And Syracuse City owns the property to the west of 
that? 
A Right. And all I'm saying is, yes, walking down this 
area when we walked it, there were remnants of fence down in 
this area right here, for sure of 47. I could see that. But I 
did not go down and line it up with anything down here on the 
road. I just know that as I looked down there were still 
remnants of the fence. 
Q Down in that area? 
A Yeah. 
MR. SHAFFER: I'd like to ask that Exhibit 6 and 7 be 
admitted, Your Honor. 
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this area which would be 190 plus say, 50 feet is kind of where 
we lined up this fence post that we could see down here and 
there were some remnants through here down to there. We could 
ask the surveyor but that's — 
Q Did you check down below to see if there's any fence— 
A I didn't check down in here. I saw this right down 
in an area I'd say maybe 200 feet from the road. 
Q You don't know if there was any fence between the 
road and there? 
A Well, there was remnants of fence that I could see 
beyond that but I didn't use that because that wasn't where my 
property stopped. 
Q (inaudible) the fence to the south of that? 
A Yes. To the south of what would be considered my -
what should be considered Syracuse's southeast corner, yes. 
Q Do you remember any remnants of the fence down in— 
A Down by the road, I don't but up in this area beyond 
where I stopped my fence line, I do. 
Q You didn't walk that area, did you? 
A Yeah, we did because this area right here is actually 
- when I say this area, I'm talking my southwest corner was my 
property. 
Q Parcel 76. 
A Yeah, Parcel 0076, that's correct. 
Q And that's your south (inaudible). But as far as you 
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west 1,437.10 feet along the section line; and north 0 degrees 
9 minutes, 27 seconds east, 294.00 feet from the southeast 
corner of the southwest quarter of Section 10, Township 4 
north, Range 2 west, Salt Lake base and meridian and running 
fence north 0 degrees, 9 minutes, 27 seconds east, 1,025.0 feet 
to and along the said fence line to the point or termination." 
Q So is that, in there it recited there was a fence 
line that was determining your east boundary line; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. When we talked or either the 
engineer or myself talked, we were basing everything on that 
fence line. 
Q When you made this observation of this property did 
you look to the south of where the property you purchased, did 
you see any remnants of any fence down in that area, if you 
remember or do you not? 
A I know right down here — 
THE COURT: You need to describe this in words. 
Q (BY MR. SHAFFER) Here's the Banbury Road, here's the 
property you purchased right along here. 
A Somewhere down in this area, okay I'll say the area— 
Q Close to the road? 
A It would probably be an area - I didn't see anything 
down close to the road but probably something back in - let's 
just see if that's 190 feet - I'd probably say right around in 
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at all and so what that did is it kind of cleared up the title 
so that we could put that fence in there and then that's where 
we established the fence line and then constructed the fence. 
Q And that gave you your 13 rods? 
A I don't know about that. It could have, it may not. 
It might have given me extra. 
Q At least that was where the defining line was between 
yourself and Syracuse City that owned the property adjoining to 
the west? 
A Yeah. 
Q And that was where they felt the property line was? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Yes? 
A Yes. 
Q On that boundary line agreement, there's a recital in 
there in the document that states that that is the boundary 
line and then it - in the description area, could you just read 
that first sentence there in the description? 
A "The parties hereto" right there? 
Q Right at the first of the description area. 
A "Beginning at the intersection" right there? 
Q Yes. 
A "Beginning at the intersection of a fence line 
projection running north to south and the south line of said 
point beginning south 89 degrees 58 minutes and 46 seconds; 
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A Yeah, it was the -
Q Fence line? 
A Well, the remnants of the fence line. 
Q And the ditch line? 
A Yeah. 
Q I show you what's been marked as Exhibit 6. Does 
your signature appear on that? 
A Yes. 
Q And can you tell me the purpose of this exhibit 
between yourself and Syracuse City? 
A Yes. I hope I can remember what the - again, what it 
was is they were putting pressure on me to put a fence in there 
and when I went to put the fence up, like I said, there was a 
gap there and generally speaking if there's a gap, I just go to 
the property owner that is involved next to that gap and just 
kind of work out whatever can be worked out and because there 
was a gap on the other side, so there was a gap on both sides, 
the city took the position that those boundary lines were 
probably suppose to be shifted anyway so they'd have the right 
amount of property; everybody would have the same amount of 
property that they had been paying taxes on and I don't know if 
the city pays taxes but everything would be shifted to the west 
and it would accommodate everybody that had all received their 
parcels and so they granted a boundary line, we just did a 
boundary line agreement. There was nothing contested about it 
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A Yes, but I'd have to go through and see that but I 
would say yes, that's the document. 
Q So it was around December 27Lh of 1995 when you 
purchased that? 
A Yes. 
Q Your intent was that you - when you originally looked 
at the property line or the property, was there any 
determination as to where the property lines were, the boundary 
line was or when you looked at it, where did you think you were 
buying? 
A When I purchased it? 
Q Yes. 
A Generally when I purchase it, I generally just 
purchase the product and I base it on what they tell me it is 
and I'll put in the earnest money that it's to be determined at 
closing. 
Q But when you bought this land did you observe the 
land before you purchased it? 
A Right. 
Q And what was your understanding? Where was your east 
boundary line? 
A Well, we walked the property and it was ]ust - I'd 
have to say it would have been shown as the fence line. 
Q And that was your understanding that it was the fence 
line? 
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whatever was being done up there is still on this piece that is 
not developed into any lots right now and so it's the same 
exact thing that was on it. 
Q Which is a little further south. 
A Which is south, which is still the piece of property 
and it's kind of a grass hay or something like that and we do 
still cut it. 
Q But that went from the fence to the east; is that 
correct? 
A That went to the fence to the east and all the way to 
the north of the property that I purchased from the Dahles and 
all the way to the east from the property that I purchased frorr 
the Dahles. 
Q Okay. 
THE COURT: Do you have a date for when this was 
purchased? 
MR. SHAFFER: Yes, I have a copy of the deed, Your 
Honor that I can show. 
Q (BY MR. SHAFFER) Let's look at what has been marked 
as Exhibit 7, Mr. Hazen. Can you identify what that is? 
A That's the warranty deed warranting against C & H 
Associates and I'd have to go over that property description, 
but -
Q Does that appear to be the property you purchased 
from the Dahles? 
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1 I farmed because the property down here that still has no homes 
2 | on it, has some kind of like hay grass or something. I'm not a 
3 j farmer but it's the same thing that is on it now so I would say 
4 J yes because we actually, we actually farm that out and have it 
5 baled and people use it as some kind of a hay product or 
6 ' alfalfa product or something. 
7 j Q And looking at the map there, this plat, was that -
8 May I approach? 
9 THE COURT: Yes. 
10 j Q (BY MR. SHAFFER) In your opinion, had that obviously 
i 
11 ' had some farming or some work being done while the Dahles had 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
owned it or the predecessors had owned it? 
A Well, there had to have been a ditch there. It had 
to have been used at some time and I'm not sure whether - I 
just know that when we walked it, our big question was, do we 
put the fence in the middle of the ditch? Where do we put our 
fence that we are required to put up and that's the reason I 
went to the city and to the engineer to establish where we 
really should put that fence because they were putting a little 
bit of pressure on me to get that fence up because people were 
kind of irritated because I hadn't put the fence up yet. 
Q My question also is, this farm, there was some like 
23 ! hay or grass or something-
24 
25 
A There had to have been some farming being done 
because, and I'm just telling you because the remnants of 
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Q Sure. 
A What we did is because of the fact that there was a -
at the time I guess there was a gap there and we had to 
determine where that property line went and so what we did is 
we took the fence line. I talked to my engineers as to what we 
should do and we established that as the fence line. There 
were remnants of the fence there and we used that and there was 
also - also our worry was there was a ditch there that we 
didn't want to disturb so we had to determine where the line 
was going to go so we just took the - I guess if you want to 
call it the counsel of the engineering company and— 
Q Excuse me, where was the ditch? 
A As I remember, the ditch was kind of on the east side 
of the fence, of the remnants of the fence and that's where we 
put our chainlink fence. 
Q And it ran north and south; is that correct? 
A It did. 
Q Along what was the boundary line, or the fence line? 
A Yes. 
Q Had that property been farmed or any observation of 
it being farmed? What was being done with the property at the 
time you bought it? What was the purpose of it? Was it being 
farmed? Was it being grazed? Was anything happening on it or 
was it just -
A I can't remember exactly but I'd have to say it was 
41 
A From the Dahles, uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q And when you purchased the property from the Dahles 
was there a fence line that defined the west boundary of the 
property you were purchasing? 
A There were remnants of fence there, yes. I mean, it 
was obvious that there was a fence there. 
Q It didn't still have the wires and everything but it 
still had the posts? 
A There were posts but there were some wires I can 
remember dangling from some of the posts. 
Q Who owned the property to the west of that? 
A That was Syracuse City. 
Q At that point was that determined as the boundary 
line of the property on your west side of the property you were 
purchasing? 
A The Syracuse City property? 
Q No, the Dahle property. Was that the west boundary 
of the Dahle property, the fence? 
A Yes and no. I think the property description was 
different than the boundary line or different than the fence 
line and that's the reason we had to enter into a boundary line 
agreement because we kind of - at the onset, the city requires 
us to put a fence in and we didn't know where to put that fence 
and so we had to establish that fence line. And do you want me 
to go on? 
40 
Q Did you enter into an agreement to buy some property 
from the Dahle family back in 1995? 
A Yes. 
Q There's a plat map up here. This has been identified 
as Exhibit 11, Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, just to orient you to 
the plat. This Banbury Development, did you develop that land 
there? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And did you buy that from the Hughes family? 
A From the Dahles? 
Q I'm sorry, from the Dahles. 
A Yes, I bought some of that Banbury from the Dahles 
and some of it from the Thurgoods, Darth Thurgood, Can I add 
something here? Correction on that, it's C & H Associates for 
the record and not C & H Investment. 
Q I'm sorry, it is C & H Associates, excuse me. 
A I've been hearing that so I just thought... 
Q Thank you. You're a principal of C & H Associates? 
A Yes. 
Q And what's their entitlements? What's their object? 
A C & H Associates is just a development, if you want 
to call it partnership between myself and another partner and 
we purchase property and develop it. 
Q Were you involved in the purchase of this property 
from the Dahles? 
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1 I straight line? 
2 A Right, yes sir. 
3 J MR. BACKMAN: I don't have any other questions. 
4 I Thanks. 
5 THE COURT: Anything further of this witness? 
6 MR. SHAFFER: No, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Okay, you may be seated. 
8 I MR. SHAFFER: I'd like to call Mr. Blake Hazen 
9 please. 
10 THE COURT: If he'd come forward. 
11 BLAKE HAZEN 
12 having first been duly sworn, testified 
13 upon his oath as follows: 
14 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
15 BY MR. SHAFFER: 
16 Q Would you please state your name? 
17 A My name is Blake Hazen. 
18 Q And what is your address, Mr. Hazen? 
19 I A 2084 East 75 South, Layton, Utah. 
20 Q What is your occupation? 
21 A I'm a landlord; I'm a contractor; a developer, 
22 banker. 
23 J Q It sounds to me like you've had quite a bit of 
24 involvement in real estate then. 
25 I A Yes. 
